Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2011

Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy
v. Zdenek Sorf : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Shawn E. Draney; Scott H. Martin; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Appellee.
Paul M. Belnap; Bradley Wm. Bowen; Jennifer R. Carrizal; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy v. Zdenek Sorf, No. 20110443.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3117

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20110443

ZDENEK SORF,

District Ct. No.: 100921025

Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ON APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042
Jennifer R. Carrizal, #10116

10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400
Attorneys for Appellee

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
Attorneys for Appellant

Shawn E. Draney
Scott H. Martin

STRONG & HANNI

Appellant requests oral argument and a published decision.
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COUF
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IAN L 0 2012

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20110443

ZDENEK SORF,

District Ct. No.: 100921025

Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ON APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

Shawn E. Draney
Scott H. Martin
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400
Attorneys for Appellee

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042
Jennifer R. Carrizal, #10116
STRONG & HANNI

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
Attorneys for Appellant

Appellant requests oral argument and a published decision.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T A B L E

0 F

C Q N T E N T S

Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS

n
:::

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
S ( ] MIS 1: \ R Y 01 , \ R GT IK EEN I

1

ARGUMENI
\

2

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
SORF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMEN T

°

1.

The Trial Court Failed to Make Adequate Finding
All of the Rule 60(b) Reasons Preferred by Sorf

..:.-.

2.

Sorf Has Demonstrated Meritorious Defenses to the Underlying
Action

7

a. The District's Regulations Exceed the Express Language of
the Easement

...8

b. Sorf s Adverse Possession Defense is Meritorious
c

A

The Easement Has Been at Least Partially Abandoned by the
District
,

, 15

d. Equitable Estoppel "W ould Meritorioi isl;> Defend Against the
District' s Allegations
.,
,

16

IIII I RIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SORF'S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM.

roNCMisior J

::

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

19

2.5
27

ADDENDUM

, 28

ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases Cited
Arhogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, L.L.C.,
191 P.3d 39 (Utah App. 2008)

6, 7

Arnell v. Salt Lake County Bd of Adjustment,
112P.3d 1214 (Utah App. 2005)

24

Banyan Const. Co., Inc. v. t/morc £7ec. Co.,
840 S.W.2d 298 (Ms. App. 1992)

11

Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v Moyle,
109 Utah 213 (Utah 1946)

10

Cox v. East Tenn. Nat. Gas Co.,
136 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. App. 2003)

11

Droste v. Board of County Commissioners,
85 P.3d 585 (Colo. App. 1993)

22, 23

Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
795 P.2d 671 (Utah App. 1990)

16, 17

Gallegos v. Lloyd,
2008 UT App 40

13

Gillmor v. Macey,
121 P.3d 57 (Utah App. 2005)

9

Hernandez v. Baker,
104 P.3d 664 (Utah App. 2004)

4

Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Logan City,
92 P.2d 346, 349 (Utah 1939)

16

Laverty v. Massad,
661 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D. Mass. 2009)

20, 21
iii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'

Lundv. Brown,
11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000)

2,4

hunt v. Lance,
2008 UTApp. 192

15

McLeodv. Retirement Bd.,
257 P.3d 1090 (Utah App. 2011)

17,18

Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enterprise, Lnc,
942 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991)

11

Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Wachter Const., Lnc,
731 S.W.2d 445 (Miss. App. 1987)

11

Reale Lnvestments, Lnc. v. City of Colorado Springs,
856 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1993)

23, 24

Williams v. City of Central,
907 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1995)

22, 23

Other Authorities Cited
Am. JUT. 2d § 268

14

Restatement of Torts § 158

14

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-216

14

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(a)

21

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 13(d)

1

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)

2, 4, 7, 19

iv

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The District is trying to distract the Court from the true crux of this matter. What
is genuinely at issue is Sorf s constitutional right to seek redress against a governmental
entity, and whether an individual can be stripped of a legal claim as a result of a default
judgment even though the claim was not addressed in the default.
Through mistake, surprise, inadvertence and/or excusable neglect, a default
i
judgment was entered against Sorf. Despite satisfying the applicable standard, the trial
court denied Sorf s Motion to Set Aside and thereby finalized the terms of the default.
Enforcement of the default judgment resulted in a taking of Sorf s property by a
governmental entity. Accordingly, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 13(d), Sorf moved for
leave to file an after-acquired counterclaim. The trial court denied Sorf s Motion for
Leave and deprived him of any opportunity for redress. The default orders Sorf to remove
$150,000 worth of improvements from his backyard and to comply with an extensive list
of regulations that were unilaterally created by the District for the District's benefit.
It is the District's position that the result of a default should include not only entry
of the relief sought in the complaint, but also loss of all legal claims that arose subsequent
to the default. Such a rule cannot be reconciled with the Utah Constitution. One cannot
be deprived of a redressable claim simply because default was entered on earlier issues.
To promulgate such a rule in this case would unfairly prejudice Sorf and would establish
negative precedent in Utah that would reach far beyond the realms of takings law.
The useful purpose and financial value of Sorf s home is at stake in this litigation.
As such, the potential consequences are far too great to allow the District's authority to
1
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be determined without a trial on the merits. Just because default was entered as to the
claims filed by the District, that cannot possibly mean that Sorf is out of luck with regard
to his taking claim. The default should not act as a bar to Sorf s inverse condemnation
action. The decisions of the trial court denying Sorf s Motion to Set Aside and Motion
for Leave to File were an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
SORFS MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

The Utah Supreme Court has clearly advised that when considering a motion to set
aside a default judgment, the trial court should be inclined towards "granting relief... to
the end that the party may have a hearing." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277, f 10 (Utah
2000). Moreover, "it is quite uniformly regarded an abuse of discretion to refuse to
vacate a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the
defendant's failure to appear, and timely application is made to set aside." Id. at ^f 11
(citation omitted.) Sorf provided reasonable justification for his failure to answer the
District's Complaint and timely filed a Motion to Set Aside. Accordingly, the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to vacate the default judgment.
1.

The Trial Court Failed to Make Adequate Findings of
Fact as to All of the Rule 60(b) Reasons Proferred by Sorf.

Just because Sorf argued the Rule 60(b) requirements in his briefmgss does not
mean that the trial court made adequate findings of fact as to all of the proffered reasons.
The District is seeking to limit the Court's focus to only the language found in the Order
denying Sorf s Motion to Set Aside. The District's efforts must be rejected.
2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{

During the hearing on Sorf s Motion to Set Aside, Judge Fratto only made
findings of fact as to the existence of excusable neglect. Judge Fratto did not issue
findings of fact concerning mistake, surprise or inadvertence.
THE COURT: Yes. Now, I appreciate everyone's presentation. I'm
prepared to make a decision. The matter is in front of me as a motion to set
aside the default judgment. It is a Rule 60(b) motion, pled as a 60(b)
motion. It has two prongs to the analysis. The first is that there must be, in
this case, it appears to me, invoked the excusable neglect. I should set
aside the judgment as a result of excusable neglect. .. .
*

*

*

{

*

MR. BELNAP: And I understand your ruling, but the rule also speaks of
mistake and inadvertence, which I understand your analysis of the letter,
but the letter can certainly THE COURT: Well, Mr. Belnap, I'm going to stop you there. I appreciate
the other - and there's other factors in the rule, also, but it appears to me
the only one that would be applicable in this instance and with what
excuses have been given is excusable neglect, and, for the reasons I've
already stated, I do not see that there has been a showing here of excusable
neglect.
(Transcript at p. 56-63 (starting at R. 556)(Add. 3)(emphasis added).) Despite Judge
Fratto's clear ruling, the District prepared an Order that stated "Defendant has not made
an adequate showing of excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence . . . . "

(R. 353-

354)(emphasis added.) The Order was drafted broadly by the District for the District's
benefit.

Sorf objected to the Order and the language contained therein.

(R. 350-

352)(Add. 1.) Thereafter, at a hearing on May 12, 2011, Judge Frattp made statements in
open court that clearly contradicted the Order. (See Transcript at p. 30-32 (starting at R
558)(Add. 2).) The terms of the Order do not accurately reflect what Judge Fratto
actually decided.

As such, the Court cannot rely on language in the Order as being
3
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accurate and/or binding. The Court must consider all factual information that relates to
the denial of Sorf s Motion to Set Aside, and must remand this matter for a determination
as to all of the proffered Rule 60(b) reasons.
The trial court failed to support its denial of Sorf s Motion to Set Aside with
adequate findings of fact. According to Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664, 666 (Utah
App. 2004), the trial court needed to make adequate findings of fact as to "any . .. reason
specified in rule 60(b)" (i.e., mistake, surprise, inadvertence and excusable neglect)
(emphasis added). The District did not address or distinguish Hernandez in any way and
thus, it remains controlling authority. Judge Fratto's ruling was based only on whether
excusable neglect was present. Judge Fratto did not issue findings of fact with regard to
mistake, surprise or inadvertence. (Transcript at pp. 56-63 (starting at R. 556)(Add. 3).)
As such, he did not fully address the reasons why default was entered against Sorf. Judge
Fratto's actions were improper and amount to an abuse of discretion. This matter must be
remanded to the trial court to make findings as to whether the default judgment was
entered against Sorf because of mistake, surprise or inadvertence.
The District also failed to distinguish Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). In
Lund, the Utah Supreme Court stated that relief under Rule 60(b) requires only that the
moving party show "they possessed a reasonable, good faith belief as to the reasons the
default was entered. Id, at 280 (emphasis added). Sorf made such a showing. Sorf did
not act blatantly or willfully to ignore pleading deadlines. Default was entered due to
excusable neglect, genuine mistake, surprise and/or inadvertence. While the Complaint
and Summons were delivered to Sorf s house, the woman at the home did not accept
4
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them. By the time Sorf returned home, the papers were gone. The first document Sorf
actually received in this matter was a letter from the District expressing willingness to
discuss an "amicable resolution."

(R. 118.)

Based on that letter and subsequent

conversations with the District's counsel, Sorf had a reasonable and good faith belief that
the parties would work together to reach a resolution before a complaint was filed.
(Declaration of Z. Sorf at f 52 (R. 307)( Add. 4).) As soon as Sorf became aware of the
default judgment, he retained counsel and initiated efforts to set the default aside.
The District has tried to paint a picture suggesting Sorf intentionally ignored this
case and willingly turned his back on the court. Such a depiction makes no sense and is
completely inaccurate. Sorf s home is his pride and joy. He recently spent $150,000 to
improve the backyard. He did so for the purpose of personal enjoyment and residential
investment. No one in their right mind would knowingly or intentionally jeopardize their
home by not answering a complaint and risking a default judgment.

Sorf has been

actively engaged and cooperative with the District. He met with District employees on
two separate occasions for inspection of his backyard improvements. Neither employee
informed Sorf that his landscaping violated the SLA easement and neither employee
requested Sorf cease landscaping. (Dec. of Z. Sorf atffi[24-34 (R. 305 & 306)(Add. 4).)
If a District employee had told Sorf to stop landscaping he would have. (Dec. of Z. Sorf
at Tj 35 (R. 306)(Add. 4).) A stop-work order was not posted on Sorf s property until
August 2010.

By then, the backyard improvements were two days away from

completion. (Dec. of Z. Sorf at ^ 44 (R. 307)(Add. 4).) Pursuant to the District's request,
and in order to facilitate the District's access to the SLA, Sorf installed a gate on the
5
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north side of his property and provided the District with a key to the lock. (Dec. of Z.
Sorf at | 40-42 (R. 306 & 307)(Add. 4).) Sorf has spoken with the District's counsel in
an attempt to resolve the underlying matter. Sorf s actions do not show blatant disregard
or willful ignorance.

Sorf simply made a mistake about the status of the parties'

discussions. Sorf believed the parties were negotiating prior to pursuing litigation, while
the District was actually negotiating simultaneous to pursuing litigation.

This is a

perfect case of mistake, surprise and inadvertence.
The District cited to Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, L.L.C., 191 P.3d
39 (Utah App. 2008) in attempts to further its argument that default was not entered due
to excusable neglect. Arbogast is distinguishable from this matter and thus, fails to
support the District's position. In Arbogast, a loan repayment dispute arose between the
Arbogast Family Trust and River Crossings. Arbogast filed a complaint and served it on
Crossing's out-of-state counsel.

On June 28, 2006, Crossing's out-of-state counsel

communicated a settlement offer to Arbogast's counsel. The next day, June 29, 2006,
Arbogast's counsel sent a letter rejecting the offer and stating:
My client has previously granted your client an extension of time within
which to answer the complaint. However, given the present state of the
case, I am, on behalf of my client, hereby requesting that your client file an
Answer to the complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this letter.
Id at 41 & 42. Crossings failed to file an answer and thus, the trial court entered default.
The trial court denied Crossing's motion to set aside and an appeaf ensued. The Utah
Court of Appeals upheld the decision and found that no excusable neglect, inadvertent
surprise or mistake existed because Crossings had counsel at the time of the events at
6
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issue, counsel was served with the complaint, and counsel received a letter stating that a
complaint had been filed and that an answer was due. In this case, unlike Arbogast, Sorf
was not represented by counsel when the District filed its Complaint and the District's
Complaint was not served on an attorney. Further, there was no correspondence between
the District, Sorf and/or an attorney demanding an answer be filed.

Accordingly,

Arbogast is factually distinguishable and fails to suggest an absence of excusable neglect
in this matter.
2.

Sorf Has Demonstrated Meritorious Defenses to the Underlying
Action.

Despite claims to the contrary, Sorf has not argued that the default should have
been set aside because he has meritorious defenses. Rather, Sorf properly argued that
based on his reasonable explanation for not answering the District's Complaint coupled
with his meritorious defenses, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny his
Motion to Set Aside. As explained above, during a court hearing held after the Order
denying Sorf s Motion to Set Aside had been entered, Judge Fratto made statements that
clarified and corrected language in the Order. There is no confusion in Judge Fratto's
subsequent statements. He unequivocally explained that no consideration of Sorf s
defenses was done and that no determination as to the merits of Sorf s defenses was
made. (See Transcript at p. 30-32 (starting at R 558)(Add. 2).) Sorf made the necessary
showing to have the default set aside under Rule 60(b). Therefore, the trial court had a
duty to consider whether a meritorious defense had been presented. Failure to consider
Sorf s defenses was an abuse of discretion.
7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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The fact that Sorf asserted 19 affirmative defenses in his proposed Answer but
argues only four on appeal in no way suggests Sorf has conceded the unargued defenses
lack merit. Sorf would have liked to argue all 19 defenses on appeal, but had to be
selective in deciding which arguments to assert in order to comply with page length
restrictions. Sorf s proposed Answer satisfied the meritorious defense requirement
because if proven, would have precluded recovery by the District.
a.

The District's Regulations Exceed the Express Language of
the Easement.

Sorf asserted a meritorious defense concerning the overbroad scope of the
District's regulations. Sorf has correctly framed the argument on this issue. The focus is
not whether the District has authority to promulgate regulations. The proper analysis is
whether the District's regulations exceed the express language of the original easement.
Even if the District has power to promulgate regulations concerning the SLA, such
authority is not without limits. In fact, the District recognized limits to its authority by
initiating the underlying case. In its Complaint, the District asked the trial court to
"declar[e] [the District's] property rights; . . . declar[e] [the District's] regulatory
authority; . . . [and] declar[e] [the District's] rights and powers to remove Defendant's
improvements . . . ." (Complaint at f 61 (R. 16)(Add. 5).) If the District had the type of
unlimited authority it suggests in its brief, there would have been no reason to file the
underlying matter or to ask the trial court to make a determination as to the scope of its
regulatory authority, rights and powers.
The District's current authority over the SLA easement cannot be any broader than
8
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the rights granted by the original easement. "Where an easement is created by a written
instrument, like an agreement, a grant, or a deed, the rights founded on such an instrument are
limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Gillmor v. Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 67 (Utah
App. 2005)(citation omitted.) The District has pieced together language from multiple
easement deeds in attempts to make the original grant of rights seem broader than it truly
was. (See Brief of Appellee at p. 27.) The original easement deed entered in 1946 was a
simple, one page document that gave the District authority "to construct, reconstruct,
operate and maintain a pipeline or pipelines on, over and across the following described
property . . . ." (R. 39)(Add. 6.) When the District deeded the easement to the United
States in 1962, the easement language was expanded such that the District claimed the
authority to convey to the United States the right "to construct and reconstruct, operate
and maintain an underground pipeline and appurtenant structures, which latter may be
situated above ground surface, on, over or across the following described property . . . ."
(R. 48 & 49)(Add. 7)(emphasis added.) The underlined language and/or rights did not
appear in the original deed.
In 2006, the United States quitclaimed the SLA to the District in a five-page
document. The District was purportedly given "all . . . interests in lands, facilities,
equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances that in any wise are part
of or essential to the ownership, operation, or maintenance of the Aqueduct Division of
the Provo River Project . . . ." (R. 43-47)(Add. 8.) The language in the 2006 deed
exceeds the scope of rights granted by both the original easement and the 1962 easement.
Based on the 2006 quitclaim deed, the District formulated 11 pages of regulations
9
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restricting ho w homeowners can use and improve their property within the easement
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persuasive. The easement language in the cited case law is substantially broader and
fundamentally different from the easement language in this case.
In Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enterprise, Inc., 942 F.2d 1519, 1522 (10th
Cir. 1991), the easement stated:
Grantee shall have the right to clear and keep clear all trees, undergrowth and
other obstructions from the herein granted right of way, and Grantor agrees not to
build, construct or create, nor permit others to build, construct or create any
buildings or other structures on the herein granted right of way that will interfere
with the normal operation and maintenance of the said line or lines. (Emphasis
added.)
In Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Wachter Const., Inc., 731 S.W.2d445,
446 (Miss. App. 1987), the easement provided the grantee the right to control:
. . . the right of ingress and egress to and from the said right of way and to
and from the said line or lines, or other equipment, or any of them, for the
purpose aforesaid. (Emphasis added.)
In Banyan Const. Co., Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 840 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Ms. App.
1992), the easement stated:
. . . the perpetual right, . . . in Grantee to survey, stake, construct,
reconstruct, erect, place, keep, operate, maintain, inspect, patrol, add to the
number of and relocate at will, at any time, and from time to time, in, on,
upon, along, over, through, across, and under the herein described easement
a line or lines of towers, poles, conduits, and appurtenances, crossarms,
wires, cables, transformers, anchors, guy wires, foundations, footings, and
other appurtenances . . . . The grantor agrees that it will not erect any
building or structure or create or permit any hazard or obstruction of any
kind or character which, in the judgment of Grantee, will interfere with . . .
Grantee's facilities. (Emphasis added.)
Lastly, in Cox v. East Tenn. Nat. Gas Co., 136 S.W.3d 626, 627 (Tenn. App.
2003), the easement provided the Grantee:
a perpetual right of way and easement . . . the Grantee shall have the right
11
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from time to time to cut and keep clear all trees, undergrowth and other
obstructions on said right of way and easement that may injure, endanger or
interfere with the use of said pipe line or pipe lines
(Emphasis added,)
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Record)^ Uld 9.)

I he SI < v p.,:,.;... ,-. ... . *

easen v

••

•

•

\

n
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.„•/..
,

^i

iLaji

ui me backyard,

me

easement that extends to the east n r ihc pipeline encompasses all but a MTVT -omei if the
second na.t > u^ back} aid. ihc iav.i .•;>,:, S. . can n^e the southeast comer v\ ..^ wii\;
oiilsidi" Ihr -

ion ol ihr 1 )istricl in no u «,
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The existence of Bureau of Reclamation land-use directives in no way justify or
authorize the District's current regulations. The federal authority cited by the District
went into effect after Sorf s home was erected. Specifically, 43 CFR 429.7 was enacted
in 1983 and the Reclamation Manual was created in 2002. Sorf s home was built in
1971. Accordingly, the home had been in existence, and sitting on the SLA easement, for
many years before any federal authority was enacted demanding encroachment licenses.
The existence of Sorf s home, along with the rest of his neighborhood that sits on the
SLA easement, is clear evidence that encroachment licenses have not been historically
required. Sorf s home, created for exclusive private use, was allowed to be built on the
SLA easement without an encroachment license. At no time while holding the SLA
easement did the Bureau of Reclamation demand an encroachment license be obtained
for the continued existence of Sorf s home or development of his backyard. It was not
until 2009, 39 years after Sorf s home was built and 21 years after Sorf purchased the
property, that he was advised by the District that submission of an application was
necessary in order to make improvements to the SLA easement. (Dec. of Z. Sorf at f 11
(R. 304)(Add. 4).) The regulations and restrictions being imposed by the District do in
fact present a new and never before seen regulatory environment.
Mr. Sorf s occupation of the SLA is not trespass per se. The facts in Gallegos v.
Lloyd, 2008 UT App 40, are significantly different from this matter and thus, the case is
clearly distinguishable. In Gallegos, James and Julie Lloyd built their home on property
that belonged to Andrew and Joan Gallegos. In turn, the Gallegos' filed a complaint for
trespass, negligence and quiet title. In discussing the standards for awarding damages on
13 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a trespass claim, the court referenced the Restatement of h u t s IliaL v\a\ uted k lit..1
Di'itrk'i " -

'

Ii r il

lUr liiblt" lint* n Irespass mi III.mull under the rule stated in

Restatement ^ ; vS, it is necessary only that the actor intentional 1> be upon ;ii;; part ,-f [he
,"N The fundamental difference between ii c 1 ioyd^ .iv:ions and the

land in quests:

actions of Sort is that the 1 loyds lunll improvement, "ii pt"npeti\ ih.it i.inI
them \ vhile Sorf ii npro'i ed propert) that he purchased and owns.

ii Ixlmiy in

It is ridiculous to

suggest Sorf is trespassing in his own backyard.
b.

Sorfs Adverse Possession Defense is Meritorious.

Sorf s ad\ erse pocharacterized this issue,

- • -

{

' -^

*•

"

:-. 1 nc District has incorrectly

i'he Dislrici is misleading the Coi.r; i

suggesting that only

"governmental property" is at issue, Such is not the case. In 1988,, Sorf purchased the
home at the si lbjec t addi ess
imprc

Sine e that time, Soi f has • :: ecu ipied maintained and

-r! ^n^.-^y that he ; nialK Dvvib.
The ciiations referenced »-: ihe District dr ivt support its arguments. First, Utah

Code Ann § 78B-2 -216 does not apply because that s tatute concerns ad;v erse possession
* . ' . ^•

*

v. ihia cdbc concerns neither a public street

iA,r propert} held bj u U'wn. eit\ o- uMir i\

^eeo* d

\n . Ji ir. 2d § 268 and the cited

I Jtah case h:^ uoes not apply because those matters concern go v ei nmental land being
held i ii a pub 1 ic ti i ist

I he District has admitted that the easement was not placed into a

public trust until 2006. B} that tune, Scr^ hau ucci:pied. maintained an*1, "mproved the
easement area for IS >ears adverse to the interests *•! ::ic Di-me; ana ..^iinei .. J

'

i uii'

-i-
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redecessors.
"'"s actions

during that time. The 18 years of adverse use by Sorf coupled with the easement holder's
non-use of the portion of the easement not occupied by the SLA pipeline evidenced an
intent to abandon and resulted in termination of the easement.
c.

The Easement Has Been at Least Partially Abandoned by the
District.

Sorf has not argued that the District abandoned the easement where the SLA
pipeline actually runs. However, it is Sorf s position that the District has abandoned the
portion of the easement that is not directly occupied by the pipeline. In his opening brief,
Sorf cited to hunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App. 192. The District did not distinguish Lunt in
any way. In Lunt, the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision that there was a
partial abandonment of an easement because a portion of the easement had not been used
within the past twenty years, a gate had been constructed blocking that portion of the
easement from being used, and Lunt had acquiesced in the closure by never taking any
action to object. Id. atfflf27-29. The court held that a "history of non-use, coupled with
an act or omission showing a clear intent to abandon" is sufficient to show abandonment.
Id. at TJ25. The Lunt decision supports Sorf s arguments.
Just like in Lunt, the inactivity of the District and its predecessors for the past
several decades constitutes an abandonment. The District admitted that enforcement of
the easement was "admittedly lax."

(Brief of Appellee at p. 5.)

In all actuality,

enforcement was not just "lax" but has been non-existent. Between 1946 and 2009,
homes, patios, sheds, trees, swimming pools, tennis courts, neighborhood streets, etc.
were allowed to be erected on the easement. Now suddenly, without there being any
15
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i * • me in the easement language, the District is claiming that homeowners cannot have
any physical struc t ures on the easement and that the D Lsti let can rest rict all impro \ • ements
V : C .......

,....

':'strict's right to restrict surface improvements was

: :,idi i:cu b- inc macth ; <•: ihc last six decade^ in permitting pcmu;r>j';:

* •!..

structures to - . .-uni on the easement. As sa^h. mere i>> a strong iikvmnwoc :...ii principals
c f abandonme tit ^ vould 11 reritorioi lsly defend against the District's allegations.
d.

Equitable Estoppel Would Meritoriously Defend Against the
District }s Allegations.

Sorf asserted a meritorious defense for equitable estoppel.
Pll'iiilable esti'piM'l .tijuinnn'h inn I'O1 MII- ^miM1 «1 <• 1

Finding Sorf s

mlf in mi unprecedented expansion

oi Utah law. The caution exercised in applying equitable estoppel to a governmental
entity exists only when the entity is "functioning in a governmental, as opposed to a
pi

- - M -

App. 1990).

-

.'•:

•

•

.

,

:

.

*

•

ii muol be remembered that when me State functions in ;L> pr.>r-:cnm

capacity, it will receive no better treatment than an> tw 0 prrv ate Individuals who bring
their dispute before the coin ts for final resoli ition '

I c i„' (citation oniitted )

I he Utah

Supreme Court has held that the furnishing of water to inhabitants is a proprietary
function. "Where a municipality is engaged in supplying water to its inhabitants, it acts
In its business or proprietary; rame; man us governmental, capacity." Home Ch\ me? s'

acting to "provide retail public water sendee" to \ arious areas of Salt Lake County.
(Complaint at ^ 5 (R 6)(Add, 5)(emphasis added )

Such actions are a proprietary
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function. Accordingly, the District is not entitled to any specific protections and it is
subject to the principals of equitable estoppel without reservation or restriction.
Despite the District's suggestions otherwise, when establishing grounds for
equitable estoppel, there is no requirement that verbal statements by a governmental
official be corroborated by a written document. The elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission,
act, or failure to act.

<

Eldredge, 795 P.2d at 675. The first element requires only that "a statement, admission,
act, or failure" be inconsistent with a claim later asserted. Id. The first element says
nothing to suggest that the statement cannot be verbal or that the statement must be made
in writing. The District has cited no authority to support its assertion that a statement or
admission serving as the basis for an equitable estoppel claim must be written and/or
supported by corroborating documents.
The McLeod v. Retirement Bd, 257 P.3d 1090 (Utah App. 2011) decision cited by
i

the District does not apply to this case and thus, must be disregarded. In McLeod, Kevin
McLeod asserted claims of equitable estoppel against the Utah State Retirement System.
McLeod claimed that employees of the Retirement System made verbal statements that
he relied upon in deciding to retire from the Davis County Sheriffs Office. During its
dealings with McLeod, the Utah State Retirement System was acting in a governmental
capacity. Accordingly, equitable estoppel was applied with a high degree of caution. In
17
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this case, as explained aou^. mc L^i.^^-t^i i^ acting m a proprietary capacity As such, the

The McLeod decision has no bearing on the dispute between Sorf and the District.
Sorf s arguments concerning the development of other properties affected by the

permitted on other properties substantiate the reasonableness of Sorf s reliance on
conversation-, with District employees. On tv. ;eas: ;wo occasions, District employees
told Sort ui,; • -,., lahdscuj/i/ig was appropriate. 1 here was no reason tor :;. ; u. question

and improvements seen around Sorf s neighborhood.
c

™-i!cmcnta! RecordV V

J

(See Pictures 7 & 8 of

0)

r r

^ ^perliea impacted b> me SLA cascmcni is iiui ucing asserted for th^ iirsi amc on

appeal. In Sorf s Supplemental Declaration filed as an exhibit to his Reply Memorandum
..Vp''''
driveway
j

; ' i. *
'"

- iv*s. • o, . : \ . , , \ i . ... . , ^.v . ai. . . ;

- = :P\^ •: .- , T , ! :

!!

.

-M-- l:-. A

":c:ei'x. pads.
• ^- <

d objects over the SLA casement" n nis neighborhood and explained *. i: " u

M -

those observations'" he belie\ ed he could improve his back} ard as long as he did not

Hie District claims that employee statements cannot be considered in conjunction
with Sorf s equitable estoppel defense because such statements would divest assets held
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historically accurate. The SLA easement was not put in to a public trust until 2006. The
SLA easement existed for 60 years (i.e., 1946 to 2006) without ever being held in a trust.
The District cannot abruptly choose to place long-standing property rights into a trust and
then claim it is entitled to protections of that trust. The majority of Sorf s use and
occupation of his property within the SLA easement took place long before the easement
was held in a public trust.
This case has critical financial and personal implication on Sorf. This is not a
matter that should be decided without considering, analyzing and resolving the District's
allegations on the merits. The trial court failed to made adequate findings of fact as to all
of the Rule 60(b) reasons proffered by Sorf and failed to consider Sorf s multiple
meritorious defenses. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
Sorf s Motion to Set Aside. The trial court's decision must be reversed.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING SORTS MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE A COUNTERCLAIM.

The District has recognized and admitted that Sorf has a legitimate takings claim.
"Sorf s regulatory taking claim ripened when [the District] took action to enforce its
regulatory rights under the easement." (Brief of Appellee at p. 37)(emphasis added.)
Despite that recognition, the District is urging this Court to trap Sorf with procedural
technicalities such that he loses his claim. On one hand, the District is arguing that Sorf
lost his taking claim because the District filed its Complaint first and Sorf s claim was
compulsory to those addressed in the default. On the other hand, the District is arguing
that the Motion for Leave was procedurally improper and thus, not an available
19
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alternative. ' he Di s ir) c i i -i us 111 u u i c L v * u it's r ules as bom a sihv-iu . . a a sword, I he way

holding a legitimate and redressable claim.
It would be unjust:, illogical and unconstitutional for Sorf to lose his taking claim
simply because the District got to tl le ecu u thouse first and forti iitousl> obtained a default
judgment It is 1 lie District's position that Sorf s taking claim arose when the stop-work
order v:i> affixed i.^ hi> nronem in \ugust 2f '~- T-.
liu. ;;.>;;KI .-... ;^ v wiiipiaiiit.

: ; : 'V * uer. ii ^viurer 2010,

u.*. wj^iiicl ^ arguing tl:u. .>* *. ^ ia,w ... ^.^;^ was

serve a pleading and default wras entered. The District's arguments should be disregarded
because they have already been considered ind IcgaVy rejected.
6611 F Su] >P 2( I 55 ( D ]\fci: ss 2009), I BJ I

•

T

~ Lavr^r v Wassad,

, = . .:\

a real estate dispute. Laverty did not answer the complaint or otherwise appear and thus,
default was entered against him. Laverty moved to vacate the default and his motion was
denie-

. / .. , . ; . j . ;i_ . . ...rnpiamt again>>\ w\

be disiiiisseu br vi-^ i4
default judgmen

^

*" /

.-;;: u:_;it^ ..:». , :::puiL

. .

. v*. v uiuii thai had been lual wiui inc

! he court rejected 1 BM's argument.

As notec. LLJM Draught an action :or breach of contract in the Superior
Court, and was awarded a default judgment against Laverty. At first blush,
the application of Mass. R. Civ. P. 13(a) to the default judgment would
appear to preclude plaintiffs claims against LBM. However, Rule 13(a)
specifically says that a "pleading shall state as a counterclaim" those claims
that arise out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' that was the subject
matter of the prior suit (emphasis added.) Plaintiff ne\er filed a pleading in
the Superior Court. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments j 22, comment
e, Illustration e; see IDA Wright & Miller, Federal Practice :::rvi °rDcedures
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§ 2682 ("a defendant who fails to appear or to file a responsive pleading
and against whom a judgment is entered under Rule 55(b) should not be
prevented from asserting a claim in a later action that would have been a
compulsory counterclaim in the action that terminated by default
judgment"); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22, Reporter's
Notes ("the compulsory counterclaim rule does not apply with respect to a
default judgment entered before the filing of a responsive pleading"), citing
10A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures § 2682. Rule 13(a)
is therefore inapplicable.
Laverty, 661 F. Supp. 2d. at 63 & 64 (italics in original, underline added.) The
{

requirements of Rule 13(a) only come into effect after a pleading has been served. It is
the District's position that Sorf has never served a pleading in this matter and thus, it
cannot rely upon or seek to enforce Rule 13(a) against Sorf.
With regard to the Motion for Leave to File an After-Acquired Counterclaim, the
District is attempting to whipsaw Sorf from both sides. The District argues that the
Motion for Leave was improper because the default was final and thus, Sorf needed to
reopen the judgment. In the next breath, the District argues that the default is not final
because it is on appeal. Simply put, the District cannot have it both ways. When his
Motion to Set Aside was denied, Sorf was left holding a valid takings claim. As such,
Sorf took reasonable steps to ask the trial court for an opportunity to assert his claim.
Sorf s Motion for Leave was appropriate because he had already attempted to reopen the
default judgment by filing the Motion to Set Aside.
When Sorf used the term "finalized" in his initial brief, he was referring to the act
of the trial court upholding the default judgment. Until it was clear that the default was
going to remain in effect, the right and authorities of the District over Sorf s property
were up in the air. In the event the trial court set the default aside, the parties would have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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gone back to the terms of the Complaint, including the District's request for the court to
declare its rights and authorities over Sorf s property. In that situation, the restrictions
and regulations on Sorf s property would have been put on hold and there would be no
taking. It was the denial of the Motion to Set Aside that defined how Sorf s property
could and could not be used and thus, it was that event that triggered the ripening of
Sorf s taking claim.
The case law cited in Sorf s initial brief does in fact support his argument
concerning when his takings claim ripened. The District has attempted to distinguish
Droste v. Board of County Commissioners, 85 P.3d 585 (Colo. App. 1993), on the
grounds that claims were still pending before the trial court when the appeal in Droste
ensued. The procedural formalities of why only a partial final judgment was rendered in
Droste are not of great significance. What is important is the court's reasoning behind its
decision. The court held that Drostes' inverse condemnation claim was not ripe because
"a final determination on that claim ha[d] not been made." Id. at 591. The same situation
exists in this matter.

The District's attempts to impose regulations on Sorf did not

constitute a final decision. The District simply told Sorf that the regulations applied but
then asked the trial court to make a determination as to whether the regulations were
appropriate and whether the District even had the authority to promulgate regulations.
Until the default judgment was upheld with the denial of the Motion to Set Aside, no
final determination had been made as to the District's rights over Sorf s property.
In relation to Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1995), the
District again focused on immaterial facts in attempts to distinguish relevant case law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Despite the District's assertions, it was not the length of the moratorium or the absence of
a permit denial that led the court to conclude plaintiffs inverse condemnation claim was
not ripe. Rather, just like in Droste, the holding was based on the absence of a final
determination as to application of the governmental regulation to the plaintiffs property.
A claim for inverse condemnation alleging that the government has
executed a permanent regulatory taking is not ripe until a final
decision has been made as to the uses to which the property may be
put. Wilkinson v. Board of County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 1269 (Colo.
App. 1993); Reale Investments, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d
91, 94 (Colo. App. 1993) (a "court cannot determine whether a
regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation
goes").
Id. at 708 (emphasis added.)
The District's reliance on Reale Investments, Inc. v. City of Colorado Springs, 856
P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1993) is unfounded. The decision in Reale actually supports Sorf s
arguments. Just like in Droste and Williams, the critical factor in Reale for determining
ripeness was the existence of a final determination. "A court cannot determine whether a
regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes. That effect
cannot be measured until a final decision is made as to how the regulations will be
applied to the property in question." Id. at 94 (citation omitted.) In Reale, the city
planning commission had full authority to review and deny Reale's zoning application.
However, the commission did not have an opportunity to exercise its power because
Reale withdrew his zoning request. Accordingly, no final decision was made concerning
application of the regulations to Reale's property.

In this case, the District lacked

confidence in its authority to issue a final decision concerning application of its
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regulations to Sorf s property and thus, asked the trial court to do so. Reale does not
stand for the proposition that a final determination has to be made by the governmental
entity. Rather, Reale simply holds that a taking claim is ripe when a final decision has
been made. In this case, the District asked the trial court to make such a determination.
No final determination was reached until the default judgment was upheld with the denial
of Sorf s Motion to Set Aside.

Raising an inverse condemnation claim prior to

fmalization of the default judgment would have been premature.
The District is trying to convince the Court that unless Sorf has been denied all
economically beneficial use of his property he cannot suffer a taking. The District's
representation is incorrect. A taking exists when a "regulation goes too far" and can be
found even if the regulation falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial uses of
the property. Arnell v. Salt Lake County Bd of Adjustment, 112 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Utah
App. 2005) (abrogated on other issues).
Even if a regulation falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial
use of land, an analysis of a complex of factors indicates whether the
interference is so great that a virtual taking has nonetheless occurred. The
factors include the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations . . . [and] the character of the governmental
action.
Id. at 1220 & 1221.
The facts of this case clearly show Sorf has in fact suffered a taking. When Sorf
purchased his property in 1988, no restrictions or regulations were being enforced in
conjunction with the easement. Accordingly, Sorf purchased a home that he reasonably
believed could be utilized to his liking and that would be a sound financial investment.
24
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Two decades later, the District suddenly formulated 11 pages of regulations concerning
how Sorf s property can, and more importantly, cannot be used. {See Add. 10.) Sorf s
ability to sell his home has been dramatically diminished, if not completely destroyed, as
a result of the default judgment. No reasonable buyer would purchase a home that is
subject to the extreme use regulations imposed by the default judgment. To the extent
Sorf is no longer able to sell his home, he has suffered a total taking. To the extent he
would be forced to sell his home at a significantly reduced price would create a virtual
taking based on distinct investment-backed expectations.
Even if this Court concludes that the default judgment was not the result of
mistake, surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect, the Court should not be comfortable
with upholding the trial court's decisions. To do so would create a new law whereby a
party could get trampled on by the government, and not obtain redress, simply because
default was entered on earlier issues. Such a holding would have dramatic ramifications
not only on takings law, but any type of legal matter where default is a possibility. It is a
basic principle of jurisprudence that every case should be heard on its merits. As such,
Sorf should be afforded an opportunity to assert his taking claim. The trial court's denial
of Sorf s Motion for Leave was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Sorf respectfully requests that the decisions of the
trial court denying his Motion to Set Aside and Motion for Leave be reversed.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herby certify that on thig^y day of January, 2012, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF and a copy of this Certificate of Service
were served by the method indicated below to the following:
Shawn E. Draney
Scott H. Martin
& MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN

(/^TU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27

DATED t h i i w b day of January, 2012.
STRONG #HANNI

Belnap
Bradley Wm. Bowen
Jennifer R. Carrizal
Attorneys for Appellant Zdenek Sorf

26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
Addendum No. 1:

Sorf s Objection to Proposed Order Denying Motion to Set Aside

Addendum No. 2:

Select pages from Hearing Transcript dated May 12, 2011

Addendum No. 3:

Select pages from Hearing Transcript dated March 8, 2011

Addendum No. 4:

Supplemental Declaration of Zdenek Sorf

Addendum No. 5:

Complaint

Addendum No. 6:

Original Easement

Addendum No. 7:

1962 Deed

Addendum No. 8:

2006 Deed

Addendum No. 9:

Supplemental Record accepted by the Court on October 28, 2011

Addendum No. 10:

Regulations for Non-District Use of Salt Lake Aqueduct

28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM "1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

v,ML£D
^ HiHO OtSTRlCT COURT

IIHARI7 "ArtKII

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042
Casey W.Jones, #12133

SALT LAK^blPIWI/MENT

STRONG &HANNI

DEPUTY'CLERK

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
Attorneys for Defendant ZdenekSorf

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE & SANDY,
' •

- " ' • ' "

•'"

> . < • . • ' • ' - . • • .

• •

•

•

:

•

•

Plaintiff,
V.

-

.

.

.

.

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION T.Q SET
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Civil No.: 100921*025

ZDENEKSORF,
Judge Fratto
Defendant.

The defendant Zdenek Sorf objects to the Plaintiffs [Proposed] Order, Denying
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment for the following reasons:
1.

The Court misapprehended the factual basis and showing of mistake,

inadvertence and excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) URCP as it applies to the position of
defendant on his motion. A finding that defendant was properly served did not preclude and
override defendant's argument of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect relative to his
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understanding that the letter of October 28, 2010 was soliciting discussions for resolution of the
matter.
The Court was in error in applying the legal standard it indicated to defendant's
argument.
The Court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default on defendant's
argument of mistake, inadvertence and excusable neglect.
The Court erred in its legal interpretation and relationship of legal determination
with the facts argued by the defendant relative to defendant's defenses and the Court's
determination that the same were not meritorious.
The Court's stated basis for its rulings are inadequate under the facts presented by
the defendant and an error in legal standards have been applied.
DATED this/, ) day of March, 2011.

STRONG # ^ 5 J N N I

fasiA'4M/

*aul M. Belnap
Bradley Wm. Bowen
Casey W. Jones
Attorneys for ZdenekSorf
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I herby certify that on this (^

day of March, 2011, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Objection to Plaintiffs [Proposed] Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set
Aside Default Judgment and a copy of this Certificate of Service were served by the method
indicated below to the following:
Shawn E. Draney
Seott H. Martin
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for Plaintiff

(V)
( )
( )
(V)

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

^L.
003770.00701
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don't think that —

or maybe is minor -- in the great

scheme of things, a minor -- a bit of dirt and a bit
of rock and so forth.
But I don't know that I take that into
account.

I take into account the character of what

is the judgment, and what will happen here is, if
this judgment is executed upon, that means the
bulldozers go in and make some —

not anything that

can't be restored, but something that's permanent,
and I think that's the Johnson case, the —

yes, I

suppose you could restore your law practice, but the
fact of the matter is, if you're shut down, your
practice comes to an end, and the effects of that can
be permanent, even in the long haul, but it's
certainly permanent in the short run.
And then I -- and so I think the statutory
scheme is this:

In a civil action, i f you post a

supersedeas bond, the judgment is stayed, and the
only question is what the amount of the supersedeas
bond should be.

That is my discretion, as to what

the amount of the supersedeas bond should be.
In this case I take into account the fact
that this is a default judgment.

I did, as part of

Mr. Belnap's motion to reconsider this, opine in
terms of the —

whether there was a meritorious

RENEE
L. STACY,
RPR
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defense presented, and there's a distinction here
between a meritorious defense presented at the time
of the motion.

That's the only time I can judge it,

in relation to the motion, and whether there is
ultimately a meritorious defense.
But, in any event, I did not opine that
what was offered were frivolous defenses, so we have
a default judgment in which the merits of the matter
have not been determined, and I cannot find that what
has been raised as defenses are frivolous, and it
seems to me that, as I say, that the execution on the
judgment results in permanent -- a permanent
situation.
And then I suppose the fifth element that
I'm looking at here is that the amount suggested, and
by your own admission, is really just pulled out of
the air, what would reflect your damages cannot be
reduced to a dollar amount, I mean, in terms -MR. DRANEY:
THE COURT:

In large part, that's true.
-- of if there is a stay.

And,

in fact, the damages are quite speculative, in any
event, that I'll have to go in -- that this
cooperation, in the event that we have to go in, will
not be there and so forth is very, very speculative,
really, on all sides.
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If anything, Mr. Belnap -- Mr. Sorf,
through Mr. Belnap, has expressed a desire to
cooperate, and -- but, in any event, it seems to me,
as I say, that it f s a permanent thing.
On the other hand, the rule, it seems to
me, does not give discretion as to whether there
should be no supersedeas bond, but there has to be
some supersedeas bond, and my only task here is to
determine what the amount is, not whether there
should be any.

That was my question, as to whether

there's anything else in our rules or authority that
said in a civil matter you can stay a judgment.
And so it seems to me, in short -- Ifm
trying to be as clear as I can -- that if you post a
supersedeas bond, the judgment is stayed.
of the bond is to be determined by me.

The amount

I take into

account, in determining what the amount is, the
factors I've already outlined.
judgment.
issues.

It's a default

There's been no determination on the
I have not found the defenses -- what's been

raised here is frivolous or that the appeal is -would be engaged in for dilatory reasons for improper
purposes, and it seems to me that if the judgment is
permitted to be executed upon, that it results in a
permanent situation rather than -- although possibly
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cases.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Belnap.

MR. BELNAP:

Thank you very much.

Can I

take that paper from you?
THE COURT:

Yes.

everyone's presentation.

Now, I appreciate
I'm prepared to make a

decision.
The matter is in front of me as a motion to
set aside the default judgment.

It's a Rule 60(b)

motion, pled as a 60(b) motion.

It has two prongs to

the analysis.
The first is that there must be, in this
case, it appears to me, invoked the excusable
neglect.

I should set aside the judgment as a result

of excusable neglect.
parts.

That, of course, has two

Number one, that there was neglect, and

number two, that the neglect was excusable.
And then, once having found that, excusable
neglect, let me proceed to what is the second factor
to consider, and that is whether there is a
meritorious defense.

Not whether there is a

prevailing defense, but whether there's a meritorious
defense.

And the reason for that, of course, is

that -- no need to set aside the judgment if we'll be
back —

we'll be back to the same spot because
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there's really no meritorious defense presented.
But those are two separate prongs.

The

first prong must be considered first, and, depending
on that decision, lead into the second prong,
excusable neglect.
What's been offered here as excusable
neglect is that, it seems to me, is fairly
characterized as Mr. Sorf was not aware of the
complaint in the first instance, and then in the
second instance, that he was led to believe that the
posture of the matter was discussion, negotiation -well, negotiation, discussion, and so forth.
The undisputed facts appear to be this, and
that is that the rule provides that one is properly
and personally served if you serve the complaint at
the residence of the defendant and upon a person
residing at that residence over the age of 18.

"A

suitable age" maybe is the rule, rather than 18, but
"a suitable age."
The undisputed facts here appear to be that
the complaint was served at the residence of
Mr. Sorf, and although the person was characterized
as his wife, representing as "my wife," that, in
fact, every inference here in terms of that there was
a person, a female, maybe more correctly
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characterized as his girlfriend, who was residing at
the residence -- and there's nothing to suggest that
yet a different female was served.
really seem to be in dispute.

That doesn't

And so the rule here

seems to be complied with, the rule in terms of
perfecting service, that is, at the -- Mr. S o r f s
residence, upon a female residing, and a suitable
age .
Now, what's offered here in terms of
excusable neglect is that Mr. Sorf was not aware of
that service, I guess inferred here that the
girlfriend, a female resident, did not advise
Mr. Sorf of that service.
Now, I have some discretion here, but I
think I have a lot of guidance in terms of what is
excusable neglect that would guide me as to what
would be the appropriate exercise of that discretion.
It appears to me that the law is fairly clear that,
"You've actually served it on someone else who didn't
advise me they had been served" is not excusable
neglect.

If, in fact, it was excusable neglect, then

it seems to me the rule would accommodate that very
real possibility, that someone else is served and
not -- and does not advise the other person in the
household.
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But the rule doesn't accommodate that.

It

provides that service is complete and perfected if
that third person, if you will, who resides at the
residence, has been served with papers.
But I also note, in terms of factually,
that apparently there was a notice of the intent to
take the default -MR. DRANEY:

And the default and several

other documents.
THE COURT:

-- that was sent, and there's

no dispute that that had been sent in terms of the
notice to take the default.
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, could you also

address the mistake -THE COURT:

Yes.

Let me finish, and then

if there's some questions, I'll entertain a few of
those, but I'm just trying to give you the reasons
I'm going to rule as I'm ruling.
As I say, I have this first prong.

The

second is the -- in terms of the service, that -- and
with this letter and so forth, that somehow "I was
misled as to the status of the matter, that I didn't
have to answer the complaint because we were in
serious negotiations and so forth," and, indeed, that
would present a meritorious defense -- or not a
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meritorious defense, but excusable neglect, that "I
was misled as to the posture of having to respond to
this complaint by what the plaintiff did in
contacting me" and so forth.
Well, without analyzing further in terms of
the contact and the reason in terms -- that only is
appropriate if I'm aware I have been served and my
obligation to answer and that I have been misled, but
apparently Mr. Sorf was not aware he had been served,
so whether he thought the posture was just in a
posture of negotiation over the lawsuit is not
applicable here.
In other words, you can't be dissuaded from
answering the complaint by being misled by the other
party when you're not aware there was even -- if
there is even a complaint and a lawsuit.
And so it seems to me that there's a
failure to show that excusable -- that first prong,
excusable neglect.

And I suppose I could bring the

analysis to a close with that, because without a
showing of excusable neglect, then the matter cannot
be set aside.

The complaint cannot be set aside.

However, there is that second prong, and
that is whether there was a meritorious defense, and
I want to address that, because I -- without really
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too much, other than to say this, that -- as I say, a
meritorious defense is not a prevailing defense,
especially, but has some merit to it, but those
offered, if you will, defenses -- that is, estoppel,
the scope of the easement is too great and the -everyone else is in jeopardy here around the
valley -- are not defense in this instance that
have -- that are meritorious.
Estoppel does not appear to me to be
applicable as a matter of law.

In terms of the scope

of the easement, indeed -- and maybe I use that word
advisedly -- there may have been, because the -- some
of the structures and some of the requirements here
did not astride the pipe, and so, as a matter of law,
we can say, "Well, there's some room for debate here
as to how far this easement goes."
But where you have a deed on this
particular property that puts into metes and
bounds -- and that f s the only fair reading of that
deed -- what the easement is, then I suppose the
conclusion is, if that deed is applicable to that
property, you build and you do things within that
easement at your own risk, and it is not really a
question of the analysis that one would go through
with the dominant and the servient estate analysis,
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and Mr. Belnap correctly points out in terms of the
analysis you make but for that deed, and so,
consequently, I don't see that there's a meritorious
defense.
For all those reasons, as I've tried to
articulate, your motion to set aside this default
judgment is respectfully denied.
Mr. Draney, if you will prepare an order
that reflects that.
MR. DRANEY:

I will, your Honor.

MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor --

THE COURT:

Thank you for your

presentations.
MR. BELNAP:
THE COURT:
MR. BELNAP:

-- may I ask a question?
Yes.
And I understand your ruling,

but the rule also speaks of mistake and inadvertence,
which I understand your analysis of the letter, but
the letter can certainly -THE COURT:
stop you there.

Well, Mr. Belnap, I'm going to

I appreciate the other -- and

there's other factors in the rule, also, but it
appears to me the only one that would be applicable
in this instance and with what excuses have been
given is excusable neglect, and, for the reasons I've
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already

stated, I do not see that there has been a

showing here of excusable neglect.
MR. BELNAP:

Your Honor, could we talk

about the next step here, and that is -THE COURT:

I f m going to stop you there,

because we're going to have to do that in another
context.

We've actually -- the next matter, I think,

was scheduled,

if I'm correct, at 3:30, and so we've

gone well beyond that.

I can only deal with what

we've got here in front of me today.
MR. BELNAP:
THE COURT:
MR. DRANEY:
THE COURT:
MR. DRANEY:

Thank you.
If you'll prepare that.
Yes.
We appreciate everyone's

—

Thank you for your time, your

Honor
(Hearing concluded at 4:06
*

p.m.)

* * *
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042
Casey W.Jones, #12133
STRONG & HANNI

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
Attorneys for Defendant Zdenek Sorf

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE & SANDY,

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF
ZDENEK SORF

Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No.: 1009211025
ZDENEK SORF,
Judge Fratto
Defendant.

I, ZDENEK SORF, declare as follows:
1.

I am over the age of 18, a current resident of the State of Utah, and I am the

Defendant in the above-captioned lawsuit.
2.

I have personal knowledge of my statements set forth herein.

3.

In 1988,1 purchased my home located at 9625 South Mount Jordan Road, Sandy,

Utah and have resided there ever since.
4.

Several large trees, rocks and brush were located on the SLA easement in my

backyard before I bought my property in 1988.
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5.

Two of the trees were at least 60 feet tall

6.

A small shed was also located on the easement prior to the time I purchased my

7.

Plaintiff Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy ("Plaintiff') recently

home.

informed me that a corner of my house and concrete patio extending from the backdoor of my
house are on the easement.
8.

For at least twenty years after I purchased my home, no one ever expressed any

concern to me regarding the trees, rocks, patio, brush and shed being located on the SLA
easement.
9.

During the nearly twenty-three years I have lived in my neighborhood, I have

observed and continue to observe concrete pads, driveways, houses, large trees, cinder block
walls, rock walls, sheds, and other structures and objects over the SLA easement. (See Exhibit 1
which is a picture of my neighbor's basketball court which is directly over the pipeline; see also
Exhibit 2 which is a picture of large tree, driveway and other large objects over the SLA
easement across the street from Mr, Sorf s property; see also Exhibit 3 which is a picture of a
stake, placed by Plaintiff, in front of the cinderblock wall identifying the Western edge of the
easement. The picture demonstrates that Mr. Sorf s neighbor has large trees over the easement.
The cinderblock wall, which is directly over the easement, has three foot cement foundations; see
also Exhibit 4 which is a picture of a stake, placed by Plaintiff, identifying the Western edge of
the easement. The picture shows that approximately 5 to 6 feet of my neighbor's house and
foundation are on the SLA easement.)
10.

Based upon those observations, I believed that I could improve my backyard as

long I did not interfere with the SLA pipeline.
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11.

I did not know that Plaintiff had regulations that required a landowner to submit

an application in order make improvements over the SLA easement
12.

In approximately March 2009,1 began improving my backyard.

13.

I removed the large trees, rocks and brush from the easement and graded the dirt

but did not bring new dirt onto my property. (Attached as Exhibit 5 is a picture of the tree stump
from one of the trees I removed. The gazebo and hot tub are located directly where this tree was
located.)
14.

Based upon instruction that was given by Plaintiffs representatives, I purposely

did not place any structures directly over the pipeline.
15.

I located all structures and objects far enough away from the pipeline so as to not

interfere with Plaintiffs right to maintain and operate the pipeline.
16.

The small storage shed was on the easement at the time I purchased the property

and is approximately twenty-six (26) feet from the pipeline.
17.

I placed the Hot tub in the spot where I tore out one of the large trees.

18.

In addition, the Hot tub and gazebo are located approximately forty-eight (48) feet

from the pipeline.
19.

The decorative rocks and other features on the easement are not cemented in and

can be removed if necessary.
20.

The garden boxes for vegetables are located approximately thirty-one (31) feet

from the pipeline and the water feature is approximately twenty-three (23) feet from the pipeline.
21.

In addition, another shed is not cemented into the ground and is located

approximately forty-four (44) feet from the pipeline.
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22.

In November 2009, one of Plaintiffs employees visited me at my property. I

believe his name was Lynn Coon.
23.

By this time, a majority of my landscaping was finished, except for a few items

such as the rock sidewalk, grass, roof on the gazebo, fencing and a concrete pad in front of my
second shed.
24.

Mr, Coon did not instruct me to cease landscaping or that I needed permission to

continue.
25.

Instead, Mr. Coon told me that my landscaping should not interfere with the

easement and suggested that I submit an application to Plaintiff indicating that I had improved
my property for the purpose of updating their records.
26.

Mr. Coon showed me where he thought the easement boundaries on my property

were and instructed me that I should not build or place any structures directly over where the
pipeline was located,
27.

Mr. Coon told me that the location._of my second shed was not a problem because

it was far enough away from the easement. However, he told me that two of my newly planted
pine trees needed to be relocated.
28.

I told Mr. Coon that I could move the second shed if he thought it was on the

easement but he said it was located far enough away from the center of the easement.
29.

In reliance upon Mr. Coon's affirmative representations, I poured a concrete patio

around the second shed and finished the remainder of my landscaping project.
30.

I would have immediately stopped landscaping had Mr. Coon instructed me to

cease landscaping or if he told me I was interfering with the SLA pipeline.
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31.

In May 2010, a second employee of Plaintiffs visited me at my property. I

believe his name was Troy Simmons.
32.

Mr. Simmons did not inform me that any part of my landscaping was in violation

of the SLA easement.
33.

However, Mr. Simmons suggested that I submit an application indicating that I

had improved my property.
34.

Mr. Simmons did not request that I cease landscaping,

35.

I would have immediately stopped landscaping had Mr. Simmons instructed me to

cease landscaping.
36.

Part of my landscaping project included replacing the old fences around my

property with a new wood fence.
37.

A tall cinder block wall with three foot foundations existed on the North side of

my property prior to the time I purchased my home approximately 23 years ago. {See Exhibit 6
which is a picture of the cinder block wall after I cut into a portion of it and before I tore it
completely down.)
38.

The cinder block wall did not contain a gate or otherwise permit access to that

portion of the SLA easement on my property.
39.

I tore down the tall cinder block wall and its 3 foot foundations and installed the

wood fence in its place. {See Exhibit 7 which is a picture of my wood fence abutting the old
cinder block wall.)
40.

In compliance with Plaintiffs request, I installed an access gate on the North side

of the fence in the location Plaintiff directed me to so that Plaintiff could have access to the
portion of the SLA easement on my property.
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41.

I believe I am the only person in my neighborhood that has provided such access

to Plaintiff.
42.

I have given Plaintiff a key to the lock on my access gate.

43.

Since I have lived in my home, I have never observed anyone performing any

routine inspections of that portion of the easement which transverses across my property until I
tore down part of the north cinder block wall along 94 South.
44.

In August 2010, Plaintiff requested for the first time that I stop work on my

landscaping project. I was approximately two days from completing the project.
45.

I was never personally served with the summons and complaint nor had I seen a

copy of the same until January 24,2011.
. 46.

I was not at home when the summons and complaint were purportedly served on

October 28, 2010.
47.

I have not been married for over eight years.

48.

I do not know what happened to the summons and complaint that was purportedly

served on October 28, 2010.
49.

I would have contacted a law firm immediately had I known I had been served

with a complaint.
50.

I only received a letter dated October 28, 2010 which I thought had come in the

mail for me without a complaint and summons enclosed,
51.

This letter led me to believe that Plaintiff wanted to reach an* amicable resolution

and that is why I called Plaintiffs counsel on November 22, 2010.
52.

When I telephoned Plaintiffs counsel on November 22, 2010, I understood that

Plaintiff would only initiate an action against me if I could not reach a settlement with Plaintiff
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53.

I am not an attorney and do not understand what it means to "enter a default

certificate."
54.

I telephoned Mr. Winsor and Mr. Wilson on or about November 22, 2010 but I

was unable to contact either of them.
55.

I have three numbers I could have called Mr. Winsor and Mr. Wilson from,

including (801) 301-1160, (801) 531-9922 and (801) 521-4177.
56.

I have never been arrested or put in jail.

57.

Based upon my conversations with Murray City Court and Third District Court,

there is not a warrant for my arrest.

I DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH THAT THE
FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.
Executed this lp_ of February, 2011.
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"'*" <\m* CMrfi

SHAWN H. DRANHY (4026)
SCOTT H. MARTIN (7750)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Facsimile; (80l)?63-0400
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN 'THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
ft

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OT SALT LAKE & SANDY,

ty&
Plaintiff.

XDKNEKSORF,

)
)
)
)

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

)

Civil No. 100^ Z \ 0 2 5

)

Judge

"prfffto

)

Defendant,

)

Plaintiff, Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") alleges as
follows:
:';.:•••:'•'
1.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION.-AND VENUE

MWDSLS is a Metropolitan Water District, a form of Local District, governed by

Utah Code Ann.. Title 17B. Chapters 1 and 2a, particularly Title 17B. Chapter 2a, Pan 6. As
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such, MWDSLS is an independent political subdivision of the State of Utah. MWDSLS' offices
are located in Salt Lake County.
2.

Defendant is an individual residing in Sandy City. Salt Lake County.

3.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-5-102, 78B-3-

205,and78B-6-401.
4.

Venue is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-301 (1), as the real property

that is the subject matter of this action is located in Salt Lake County.
FACTS AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
MWDSLS and the SLA
5.

MWDSLS provides an on-demand, supplemental, wholesale, treated water supply

to its member cities, Salt Lake City and Sandy City. The Public Utility Departments of
MWDSLS member cities provide retail public water service to not only the residents and
businesses within their respective city boundaries, but to other areas of Salt Lake County as well.
For example, the Salt Lake City Public Utilities Department service area extends as far south as
Sandy on the east side of Salt Lake Valley, with approximately 100,000 customers outside Salt
Lake City, and approximately 100,000 customers inside Salt Lake City.
6.

MWDSLS also shares certain facilities with Jordan Valley Water Conservancy

District ("JVWCD"), the other large water wholesaler that provides supplemental drinking water
to most of the Salt Lake Valley not served by Salt Lake City Public Utilities or Sandy City
Public Utilities.

2
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7.

One of the critical pieces of public water delivery mfrastructure in the Salt Lake

Valley is the Salt Lake Aqueduct ("SLA").
8,

The SLA was designed and constructed by the United Slates, Department of the

Interior, Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") as a division of the Provo River Project. The
most prominent feature of the Deer Creek Division of the Provo River Project is the Deer Creek
Dam and Reservoir at the head of Provo Canyon in Wasatch County. MWDSLS is by volume
the largest user of Provo River Project water and the second largest user of Central Utah Project
water stored in the Jordanelle and Deer Creek Reservoirs.
9.

The SLA is a mostly 69-inch inside diameter, mostly steel reinforced concrete,

pipe, constructed beginning hi 1939 and completed in 1951.
10,

The capacity of the SLA is approximately 175 cubic feet per second (cfs). This

equates to nearly 79,000 gallons per minute, and approximately 113 million gallons per day
(GPD). At the peak demands of summer the SLA typically runs at maximum capacity.
11,

The SLA extends more than 41 miles from the toe of the Deer Creek Dam at the

head of Provo Canyon, to a 40 million gallonfinishedwater storage reservoir at approximately
3300 South and 1-215 near the mouth of Parleys Canyon,
12.

The SLA carries untreated Provo River System water to the Little Cottonwood

Water Treatment Plant ("LCWTP") at the end of Danish Road, Cottonwood Heights, Utah, near
the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon. The SLA also seasonally serves untreated water to the
JVWCD Southeast Regional Water Treatment Plant in Draper.

3
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13.

LCWTP treats Little Cottonwood Creek water in addition to water from the Provo

River System. From LCWTP, the SLA carries treated (aka "finished") Provo River System and
treated Little Cottonwood Creek water to a wide variety of places in Salt Lake County
ultimately.
14,

The finished water portion of the SLA is tied to 3 other large aqueducts. The

Point of the Mountain Aqueduct ("POMA") runs between the SLA at the LCWTP site, and the
Point of the Mountain Water Treatment Plant ("POMWTP") in Draper. Near POMWTP, POMA
connects to the 150th South Pipeline, which connects to the finished water portion of the Jordan
Aqueduct ("JA"), a very large aqueduct that catries water on the west side of the valley. The raw
water portion of JA takes water from the Provo River System to the Jordan Valley Water
Treatment Plant ("JVWTP") in Herriman.
15,

The SLA, POMA, the 150lh South Pipeline and J A allow movement of water from

the east side of the valley to the west side, and .from the west side of the valley to the east side.
16.

The SLA plays a critical role in the water supply for essentially the entire Salt

Lake Valley.
17:

In 1938, MWDSLS contracted with Reclamation to repay to the United States all

of the costs of constmcting the SLA, Under that 1938 Repayment Contract, MWDSLS was also
obligated to operate, maintain, repair and replace the SLA. In return, MWDSLS received the
exclusive use of the SLA.

4
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18.

The 2004 Provo River Project Transfer Act, Pub.Law 108-3 82, authorized the

Secretary of the Interior to transfer the SLA to MWDSLS. As a result, MWDSLS now owns the
SLA.
19.

The SLA is located within the SLA corridor. The SLA corridor consists of

easement and fee lands now held by MWDSLS.
20.

While the SLA is mostly 60+ years old, it is in good condition. However,

MWDSLS is making preliminary preparations for major rehabilitation work on the SLA in the
next decades.
21.

The SLA is "open flow," which is to say it is not pressurized, and can be shut off

only at the intake at the toe of the Deer Creek Dam.
22.

Routine access by MWDSLS staff to all parts of the SLA is critical to the care,

operation, and maintenance of the SLA and the interests of the public.
23.

Unencumbered access to the entire width of the SLA corridor for emergency

repairs is critical to the interests of the public. Construction of permanent structures on or
overhanging the SLA corridor, without MWDSLS consent, is a violation of MWDSLS' real
property interests. Planting or maintaining trees that may have to be removed for SLA
emergency repairs, without MWDSLS consent, is a violation upon MWDSLS5 real property
interests.
24.

Different segments of the SLA consist of different classes of pipe, intended for

different maximum loads. Prevention of loads beyond design capacities, resulting from the
addition of fill, structures, etc., is critical to the interests of the public. Placing fill, structures, or
5
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other materials on the SLA corridor, without MWDSLS consent, is a violation of MWDSLS'
real property interests.
25.

Prior to transfer of title to the SLA and SLA corridor to MWDSLS, any

development of the SLA corridor, even development by the holder of fee title subject to an SLA
easement, required an encroachment agreement from Reclamation.
26.

Similarly, Utah Code Ann, §§ 17B-1-103 and 17B-1-301 grants MWDSLS the

power to adopt and enforce regulations to protect the public infrastructure of MWDSLS. The
MWDSLS Board of Trustees has promulgated regulations regarding the use of aqueduct
corridors. A true and correct copy of those regulations is attached as Exhibit 1.
Defendant's Property and the SLA corridor
27.

MWDSLS is informed and believes Defendant owns the property located at 9625

South Mt. Jordan Road (at 2550 East) in Sandy, Utah ("Defendant's Property") depicted on the
survey, attached as Exhibit 2.
28.

The SLA corridor crosses Defendant's Property as depicted on Exhibit 2, This

portion of the SLA corridor that crosses Defendant's Property is referred to as Tract 417, a
Reclamation designation.
29.

Reclamation formerly owned a perpetual easement on Tract 417 "to construct,

reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including "appurtenant structures, which latter may
be situated above ground surface

" Originally this easement was acquired by MWDSLS

(formerly known as the Metropolitan Water District of Sail Lake City). A true and correct copy
of the Warranty Deed of Easement, recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder February 8,
6
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1946 as Entry No. 1028090, in Book 457, at Page 221 is attached as Exhibit 3. The easement
was conveyed to the United States as a part of the original construction of the SLA. As a part of
the SLA title transfer in 2006, the easement was conveyed by the United States back to
MWDSLS, A true and correct copy of the relevant pages of the Quitclaim Deed (Salt Lake
Aqueduct, Sail Lake County Lands), recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder October 2,
2006, as Entry No. 9862736, in Book 9359, at Pages 6770-6929 is attached hereto as Exhibit 4,
30.

On or about April 23, 2009, Defendant, either personally or through his contractor

or agent, orally requested from MWDSLS authorization to construct a garage on Defendant's
Propeity adjoining his home.
31.

In response to that request, on or about April 23,2009, MWDSLS personnel

contacted and informed Defendant, either personally or through his contractor or agent, of the
SLA, the SLA corridor, and the contact information for MWDSLS Aqueduct Inspectors, and that
Defendant should request an on-site meeting toreviewthe SLA location and Defendant's
construction plans.
32.

Thereafter, neither Defendant nor his contactor or agent contacted MWDSLS.

33.

On or about November 19,2009, while on routine inspection of the SLA corridor,

MWDSLS personnel encountered Defendant and spoke with him on-site at Defendant's
Propeity. At this meeting, MWDSLS notified Defendant of MWDSLS regulations. Defendant
was also provided with a MWDSLS standard form application for encroachment on the SLA
corridor, and instructions for filing the same.

7
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Defendant's Unauthorized Construction
3.4;

on the SLA corricJor

Approximately six months later, on or about April 26, 2010, M WDSLS personnel

observed construction work occurring at Defendant's Property on the SLA corridor. MWDSLS
had not received the SLA corridor encroachment application from Defendant al that time. As
such, MWDSLS personnel spoke to the contractor on site, and instructed him to cease work until
the Defendant had obtained the required authorization from. MWDSLS.
35.

On May 25, 2010, during a follow up inspection of Defendant*s Property,

MWDSLS personnel again found work being performed on the SLA corridor, including the
construction of buildings, retaining walls, and water features, MWDSLS still had not received
the SLA corridor encroachment application from Defendant at that time. The MWDSLS
personnel spoke with Defendant reminding him of his non-compliance and the requirement that
Defendant comply with MWDSLS procedures in making a formal application to undertake
construction or other improvements on the SLA corridor. •
36.

Shortly after his meeting with the MWDSLS personnel at Defendant's Property,

Defendant met with MWDSLS representatives at the MWDSLS offices, at which time
MWDSLS personnel assisted Defendant in completing the MWDSLS encroachment application.
37.

Shortly thereafter, MWDSLS personnel met with Defendant at Defendant's

Property assisting him with drawing his landscaping plans for attachment to his encroachment
application. A true and correct copy of the Defendant's Application and drawing from a 2008
aerial photograph is attached, as Kxhibit 5.

8
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38.

During this meeting at Defendant's Property, MWDSLS personnel informed

Defendant that the water feature and the deck extension on the SLA corridor did not meet
MWDSLS regulations and his encroachment application would likely be denied.
39.

At this same meeting, Defendant indicated to MWDSLS personnel thai it was his

intention to install a gated fence across the SLA corridor but would provide for MWDSLS access
to the SLA corridor.
40.

On June 21,2010, MWDSLS informed Defendant by letter that his MWDSLS

encroachment application was denied ("Denial Letter"). A true and correct copy of the Denial
Letter is attached as Exhibit 6.
41.

The reasons stated for MWDSLS's denial of Defendant's application included the

following:
(a)

Buildings, foundations, footings, retaining walls, decks, decorative pools,

ponds, or other water features are not allowed within the SLA corridor;

42.

(b)

Non-compliance with cover depths above the SLA; and

(c)

No new trees or vines are allowed within the SLA corridor.

The Denial Letter included a demand upon Defendant to remove or correct his

landscaping and building encroachments within thirty (30) days. The Denial Letter also included
instructions on procedures for appeal of the MWDSLS denial.
43.

On July 19, 2010, Defendant left a voice mail to MWDSLS personnel indicating

that he had been out of town and would require an extension of time to file his appeal of the
MWDSLS denial of his encroachment application.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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44.

On July 27,2010, M WDSLS sent a letter to Defendant granting him a thirty (30)

day extension until August 26, 2010 to file his appeal ("Extension Letter"). A true and correct
copy of the Extension Letter is attached as Exhibit 7.
45.

Despite repeated efforts to reach Defendant, MWDSLS has received no further

correspondence from Defendant since his voicemail of July 19,2010.
46.

Based on inspections by MWDSLS personnel, Defendant's construction activities

on the SLA corridor continued and the non-complaint structures had not been removed.
47.

On August 31,2010, the MWDSLS General Manager sent by certified mai I a

letter to the Defendant again instructing him to cease all construction activity on the SLA
corridor, to remove all improvements thereon, and to contact MWDSLS personnel within one
week ('Third Notice Letter"), A true and correct copy of the Third Notice Letter is attached as
Exhibit 8.
48.

In addition, on August 31,2010, a "Stop Work Notice" was posted at Defendant's

Property on the SLA corridor. Photographs depicting the Stop Work Notice, the date, and its
location are attached as Exhibit 9.
49.

On September 2,2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at

Defendant's Property and found that the Stop Work Notice had been relocated from its installed
location and Defendant's construction work on the SLA corridor was continuing. A photograph
taken September 2, 2010 depicting this continuing construction is attached as Exhibit 10.
50.

On September 9, 2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at

Defendant's Property and found Defendant's construction work had continued and a chain link
10 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fence had been erected, barring MWDSLS entry onto the SLA corridor. A photograph taken
September 9, 2010 depictmg this condition is attached as Exhibit 11.
51.

On September 21,2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at

Defendant's Property and found Defendant's construction work had continued with additional
soil being brought in to the SLA corridor site, and a completed fence was erected with gate
locked, fully preventing any access to the SLA corridor. The MWDSLS Stop Work Notice was
nowhere to be seen. A photograph taken September 21, 2010 depicting this condition is attached
as Exhibit 12.
52.

On September 22,2010, MWDSLS personnel again visited the SLA corridor at

Defendant's Property and found Defendant's construction work had continued with additional
soil being brought in to the SLA corridor site, the MWDSLS Stop Work Notice was nowhere to
be seen, and the gate remained locked barring all access to the SLA corridor. A photograph from
September 22,2010 depicting this condition is. attached as Exhibit 13.
53.

On or about October 11,2010, MWDSLS, for the first time, received a Blue

Stakes request for fence installation at Defendant's Property. In response, MWDSLS installed a
second Stop Work Notice on Defendant's Property.
54.

Defendants construction continues, no encroachment agreement has been reached,

and the second Stop Work Notice has been removed from Defendant's Property by someone
other than MWDSLS personnel.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - MANDATORY INJUNCTION
55.

MWDSLS incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully stated herein,
11
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56.

MWDSLS holds the dominant estate on Tract 417 of the SLA corridor, including

that portion of Tract 417 which traverses Defendant's Property.
57.

MWDSLS *s property interests include rights of full enjoyment of a "perpetual

easement" on Tract 417 to construct, reconstruct, operate and maintain" the SLA, including
above ground improvements.
58.

Defendant has wrongfully entered the SLA corridor, trespassed on and damaged

MWDSLS property interests, denied MWDSLS its rights and access to its real property interests,
violated MWDSLS regulations, and endangered critical public infrastructure.
59.

MWDSLS is entitled to an order: i) enjoining Defendant from interfering with

MWDSLS' restoration of the SLA corridor; ii) enjoining Defendant from future trespass upon
MWDSLS' property interests; and iii) enjoining future violations of MWDSLS regulations.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE
60.

MWDSLS incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully stated herein.

6\.

MWDSLS is entitled to an order: i) declaring MWDSLS property rights; ii)

declaring MWDSLS' regulatory authority; iii) declaring MWDSLS' rights and powers to remove
Defendant's improvements which infringe MWDSLS property rights, or which violate
MWDSLS regulations; and iv) quieting MWDSLS' title.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - DAMAGES
62,

MWDSLS has suffered, and continues to suffer, damages proximately caused by

Defendant's trespass and regulatory violations. MWDSLS is entitled to a judgment for damages

12
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caused by Defendant's wrongful acts, including the costs to be incurred for restoration of the
SLA corridor, together with court costs and interest.
RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, MWDSLS requests an order and judgment as follows:
A.

Enjoining Defendant from interfering with MWDSLS' restoration of the
SLA corridor; and

B.

Enjoining Defendant from any future trespass upon MWDSLS' property
interests or violations of MWDSLS regulations; and

C

Declaring MWDSLS" property rights; and

D.

Declaring MWDSLS' regulatory authority; and

E.

Declaring MWDSLS' right and power to remove Defendant's
improvements which infringe MWDSLS property rights, or which violate
MWDSLS regulations; and

F.

Quieting MWDSLS * title; and

G.

For damages suffered by MWDSLS due to Defendant's actions, including
costs to be incurred in restoring the SLA corridor, together with interest;
and

H.

For costs incurred by MWDSLS in this action; and

13
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I.

For such other relief this Court deems appropriate and just.

Signed this 26lh of October. 2010
SNOW, CHRISTENSKN & MAUTINEAU

Shawn E. Draney
Scott H. Mari in
Attorneys for Plaintiff MWDSLS
Plaintiffs.Address:
3430 East Danish Road
Sandy, Utah 84093
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH;

,

: :

)
: ss,
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Michael L. Wilson, being first duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and states that he is the
General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy ("MWDSLS") and is
authorized by the MWDSLS Board of Trustees to verify the attached Verified Complaint, and
that he is familiar with the contents of the foregoing Verified Complaint, and the allegations in
the Verified Complaint are true as stated, to the extent of ray knowledge and/or regular business
records of MWDSLS, except as to matters alleged upon mformation and belief, and as to those
matters, he believes same to be true.
DATED tliis ^ T d a y of October, 2010.

'tfklbf ±-tM^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before rhc this A'U day of October, 2010.
/J

$*#4J£LJ3$£L
f^V^^Notary Public
Residing at: .ftVffi' £

fo*trt&

My Commission Expires:
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(Quitclaim Deed No. 1 under Contract No, 04-WC40-8950)
QUITCLAIM DEED
(Salt Lake Aqueduct, Salt Lake County Lands)
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Grantor), acting by and throughthe Bureau of
Reclamation, Department of the Interior, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 17,1902
(32.Stat 388), and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, particularly the Provo River
Project Transfer Act (Public Law i 08-382.118 Stat 2212), hereby quitclaims and conveys to
MBTROPOUTAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE & SANDY (Grantee), a political
subdivision of the State of Utah, 3430 East Danish Road, Cottonwood Heights, Utah 84093, M
Ten Dollars (Sl'0.00) and Other good bud valuable consideration, all of Grantor'sright,title and
interest in and to lands and interests in lands located in Salt Lake County,, Utah, commonly
refewd to as the Salt Lake Aque&uct more particularly described in Exhibit A, attached.and by
this reference made a part hereof,
TOGETHER Wl fH, all facilities, equipment, improvements,fixtures.features ^d-appurtenances
located h\ under or upon such lands or interests in lands,
^_
TOG£TH£R WITH the rights, privileges, duties, obligations, and responsibilities of the Grantor
wtocH exisr. as of the date of this Quitclaim Deed, as a result of any, valid right>of-use agreements
entered by,Grantor. The Grantee shall honor the terms of each such right-of-use agreement as
dewibei fe-ihe Provo River Project Transfer Act and Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950, dated'""
KovembcefSf.?^.
ALL OF THE ABOV& described lands or interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvements,
fixtures, features, and appurtenances are hereinafter collectively referred to as. the "Real Property'1.
This Quitclaim Deed shall be interpreted as conveying all of Grantor's interest, pi*esent.and future,
in aU lands, interests in lands, facilities, equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and
appurtenances that in anywise are a part of or essential to the ownership, operation, or
insiiniienancc of the Aqueduct Division of the Provo River Prefect lying or located within Salt Lake
Cotinty. Utah, whether acqyired or constructed by or for Grantor, or-acquired or constructed by ox
for Grantee, or constructed by or for others pursuant to righi-ofruse agreements, except as
expressly excluded or reserved below.
THIS CONVEYANCE DOES NOT INCLUDE OR MODIFY:
1 <, Any interest in or to any National Forest system hmds crossed by the Salt Lake
Aqueduct As to such lands, Grantor shall convey to Grantee, by separate instrument an
appropriately sized, permanent easement for the use, operation, maintenance, repair, improvement,
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and replacement of fbei Salt lake Aqueduct, as described in the Provo River Project Transfer Act
aad Contract No-04-WC-4O-8950., . , .
2. Any [interests in water rights or rights to usewatar*

v

-

^

-..,

3, Any oil, gas or other mineralrightsor interests held in the name of the United States:
provided, however* that any future exploration for oil, gas or other "Federally owned minerals or
minerals rights or interests underlying the Real Property shall be conducted in such a maimer as
will not compromise the structural integrity of, or Interfere with the use, operation, maintenance,
repair or replacement of, the Salt Lake Aqueduct,-or related facilities, equipment, improvements,
fixtures,featuresor appurtenances; provided'farther that no surface occupancy for exploration or
exploitation of oil, gas, or other Federally owned mineral?rightsor interests shall be allowed on
the Real Property.
. THIS CONVEYANCE IS SUBJECT TO:

,

'• '

1. Oil, ga% and other imneralrightsreserved of record by or in favor of third-parties as of
the date of this Quitclaim Deed.
2. Valid 'permits, licenses, leases,rights-or-use*or rights-of-way of record or outstanding
on, over, or across the Real Property ia existence on the date of this Quitclaim Deed.
3. A perpetual easement reserved by Grantor on, over, or across the Real Property to
provide for lawful eoatirmed non-motorized public access to and across the Real Property for
recreational purposes; provided that such non-motorized public use stall not interfere with the use,
operation, -maintenance, repair, improvement, replacement or protection of the Salt Lake Aqueduct
and related facilities, equipment improvements,fixtures,featuresand appurtenances, and such
non-motorized public use shall be subject to all existing and future state, federal, local and Grantee
statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, policies and procedures regarding safety and security,
4. Title to any equipment, improvements, fixtures, features and appurtenances which are
part of theProvo River Project, Utah, Deer Creek Division, is hereby reserved to the Grantor.
5. Title to any equipment, improvements,fixtures,featuresand appurtenances which are
part of the Central Utah Project ia herehy reserved to the Grantor.
; .
"'/: ' "•:': •:: : -'.: •;'-:. '; .;•

NOTICE IS HEl^BY

•1. Acting pursuant to the requirements of 40 CFR 373.cn April 23, May 3? and May 18,
2006, the Grantor performed a hazardous waste survey of the Real Property, and a copy of said,
survey was delivered to the Grantee in a letter dated September 26,2006. The Real Property
conveyed herein to the Grantee is being conveyed in the same condition as existed on the date of
, said survey and which is more particularly described in that survey. No remediation by the
Grantor on behalf of the Chmtee has been or will be made.
.
2, The Grantee has used, and has had operation and maintenance responsibility for the
Real Property for over 50 years. Grantee and its successors and assigns accept tire Real -Properly'

2
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"as is" and also accept liability for the Real Property from the date of this Quitclaim Deed
forward.
3, The Grantee, its successors and assigns shall ho responsible for the protection,
identification, and preservation of cultural resources, if any, located on the Real Properly as
required by the existing and future laws of the State ofUtah,
: 4. Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed sh&ll be c o n s t a t
abandonment, forfeiture, or relinquishment by the Grantor of its basic patent right reserved by the
Act of August 30, 1890 (26 Stat, 391) as to the described lands for easements claimed, or to be
claimed, for purposes other than the Salt Lake Aqueduct: ^
5;< Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as altering or
amending the terms or conditions of any United 'States contract, or supplements or amendments
thereto, except as specifically provided in Article 20 of Contract Mo, 04-WC-4G-8950, dated
November 23, 2004,
6. If any further specific conveyances-should be necessary .hereafter, because of the
discovery of additional Real Property not listed on the Exhibits, to more specifically and legally
describe the Real Property, or because the Grantor acquires any title to or interest in the Salt Lake
Aqueduct by reason of an4 instrument k the Grantor's chain of title, or by operation of law, then
Grantor-shall make reasonable efforts to provide such conveyances, on the same terms and
conditions set forth above.
*
' \ „ .7, Nothing in this Quitclaim Deed shall be construed or interpreted as creating any
condition subsequent, reverter, or possibility of areyerter*
TO HATE AND TO HOLD unto Grantee, and Grantee's successors and assigns, the Real
Property; together with ail the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging, forever,
WITNESS the hand of the Grantor this 2nd day of October, 2006.
'

-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

•:

^X^c/:

" i " ;••-,:

/

••-:'

'
-

Approved: .

Rkk%.Qold

Regional Director, Upper Colorado Region
, Bureau of Reclamation
Acting.&r the Secretary of Interior
of the United States
v;

Umce of me Regional Solicitor
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF UTAH
;ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On this 2ndtlay of October, 2006, personally appeared before me, Rick L. Gold, loiown to me to be
the Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colorado Region, United States
Department of the Interior, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
he executed the same on behalf of THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, pursuant to authority
delegated to him from fee Secretary of the Interior,

&dL

(NOTARY SEAL)

Vi

Notary Public in and for the State of Utah
Residing at: ^ ^ i / ^ ^ '

„ P ^ J N g * BROWN!
HxHm*r<miK*WMWifiM
K
M -m £*Bt i*Br SOUTH
5$VfcQVftr MtAfr §460$
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ACCEPTANCE
The parties intend for the above Quitclaim Deed to satisfy a portion of the terms of Contract No.
04-WC-40-8950, dated November 23,2004', and a portion of the requirements of Public Law 108382. The Grantee accepts this Quitclaim Deed on the terms and conditions stated herein. The
Grantee hereby further agrees and acknowledges that: (1) the Salt Lake Aqueduct skill no longer
be regarded or Heated either as a Provo River Project or a United States facility, except with
regard to Provo River Project water as provided for in Section 17 of Contract No. 04-WC-408950, elated November 23,2004; the Grantee shall not be entitled to receive any future
Reclamation benefits with respect to the Real Property, except for Unefm that would be available
to other non-Reclamation facilities; and (3) to the fullest extent allowed by law, the Grantee agrees
to indemnify and hold harmless the Grantor, its officers and employees from any claims, liabilities
or other responsibilities which may arise subsequent to the date of this Quitclaim Deed which
result from the Grantee's .use, operation, or maintenance of the Real Properly as described in this
Qiiitclaim Deed.
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY

lael L. Wilson, General. Manager
Approved:^

gha^f E. Drauey,
A
Co'unsei.-for Metrooolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
STATE OF UTAH .
:ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On this 2nd day of October, 2006, personally appeared before me, Michael L. Wilson, known to rne
to be the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, the signer of
the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on behalf of
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy, pursuant to authority delegated to himfromthe
Board of Trustees of tire Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy.

^GTA-RY-SEA-fc)-

$
/^utP^^
~Notaiy~Pnb1ic-"hrandrfe-tii^Slate of Utah
Residing at:

AAUUNEP BROWN

M^pm&muQFm*
**e«Tt»> SOUTH'

/PRQVO,urAH848M»
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT 11 2011

Paul M.Belnap, #0279
Bradley Wm. Bowen, #5042
Jennifer R. Carrizal, #10116
STRONG &HANNI

3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant ZdenekSorf

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE & SANDY,

STIPULATION

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20110443

ZDENEKSORF,

District Ct. No.: 100921025

Defendant/Appellant.

The above-named parties by and through their counsel of record hereby stipulate and
agree that the Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal dated September 22,2011filedby
Appellant may be granted as follows:
Exhibits 1 through 10 marked and provided to the Court by Appellant at the hearing
dated March 8,2008 be added to the Record as exhibits referenced in the transcript of hearing on
said date. Said exhibits are attached as Exhibit "A."
The Appellee, Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy, prepared and caused
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to be recorded (without input JBrom the Appellant on the content of the document or the fact of
abandonment) the document entitled "Notice of Partial Abandonment of Easement" attached as
Exhibit "B" to this Stipulation. The parties stipulate that this three-page document may be added
to the record on appeal.
DATED this / /

day of October, 2011.
STRONG &HANNI

PaulM. Belnap
Bradley Wm. Bowen
Jennifer R. Carrizal
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
ZdenekSorf
7%
DATED this _ _ / _ _ day of October, 2011.

SNOW, CHRISJENSE^& MARTINET

ShawnJicDraney
; R Martin
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Metropolitan Water District
003770.00701
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Salt Lake Aqueduct
Easement Boundary
Existing Fence
Existing Gate
Existing Trees

Created: Feb. 17,2011
9625 S.Mt. Jordan Road
S-10-1107ZdenekSorf
lof2

Approximate Distance from Center
of the SLA Pipeline:
Motorcycle Barn: 44 ft
Gazebo/Jacuzzi: 48 ft
Garden boxes:
31ft
Equipment shed: 26 ft
23 ftClark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard Water
W. Hunterfeature:
Law Library, J. Reuben
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBI

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.'>1

'v

< VA, a f j

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2>
^

-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

M&tB*
I HBI^nR ^^^w^t

Jmkm
-^W^BT

i* *Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT

1

J*'

w

/

M

*

H•"•*'

pPw^f
^ - s ? ^

!
t*%*™

PM

!.

EXHIBIT
SHffiJ

J*
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

£

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

Ml
f i l l ' l-'li I I

ill
mm
iJUP1

mm
I*
Ml

to
,
Mi
«r 0

tofr**
p&j^t
:
t^vff-. *
•^Pr-

A:' v

> ^ :<\?SLa&i
:>&**

4,

X,

EXHIBIT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(O

EXHIBIT "B"
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When Recorded Return To:
Metropolitan Water District
of Salt Lake & Sandy
ATTN: General Manager
3430 E Danish Road
Cottonwood Heights, Utah 84093

iv£"R?OP0LiT/%* yATST^Oi^.r f ^ ' s i "

343C £ KkJSH ^
SAHDY UT 5 4 ^
9Vs Z # : , OE^TV - f!A 3 P,

NOTICE OF PARTIAL ABANDONMENT OF EASEMENT
NOTICE IS GIVEN TO ALL PERSONS that with regard to the property described
herein, the METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE & SANDY (the
"District"), acting consistent with District policy & procedures, hereby abandons a portion of the
easement interest held by the District through the Monte Bello Estates Subdivision, which
easement includes portions of what is currently known as Lot 2 of said Subdivision. Said
easement is more particularly described as:
COMMENCING at a monument at the East Quarter (B%) Comer of Section 10, Township 3
South, Range 1 East> Salt Lake Meridian;
Thence, South 89°44,1.0" West, along the South Line of the Northeast Quarter (NEW) of said
Section 10, a distance of 626.65 feet, and North 00° 15*50" West 1081.82 to the intersection of
the South boundary of Lot 2 Monte Bello Estates as recorded in Book FF at Page 40 in the
official records of the Salt Lake County Recorders Office, and the eenterline of the Salt Lake
Aqueduct alignment; Thence, along said South boundary line North 89°56100" West 75.00 feet;
(hence North 00°15,50fl West 7.28-feet to the intersection of West Easement line of that
Easement recorded as Entry Number 1028090 in Book 457 at Page 221, and a line coincidental
to the roofline at a South facing wall of an existing house being the POINT OF BEGINNING;
thence North 1 l°29fO0rt East 30.89 feet along said West Easement line to a point on a line
coincidental to the roofline at a North facing wall of said existing house; thence along said line
South 82°44'52M East 2.07 feet to a comer coincidental to the corner formed by the rooflines at
said North facing wall and an East facing wall of said existing house; thence South OT^IS'OS"
West 30*81 feet along a line coincidental to the roofline at an East facing wall of said existing
house to a comer coincidental to the corner fonned by the rooflines at said Eastfeeingwall and a
South facing wall of said existing house; thence along a line coincidental to the roofline at said
South facing wall of said existing house North 82*44'52n West 4.35 feet to the point of
beginning. Contains 99 Square feet more or less.
The original easement granted to the District is a perpetual easement to construct
and reconstruct, operate and maintain an underground pipeline and appurtenant
structures. The District now abandons that portion of the original easement which is
encumbered by a portion of the existing home.
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The District's historical interest in the Subject Property is as follows:
1.
On February 4,1946, the District was granted a one hundred twenty-five
foot wide perpetual easement by Warranty Deed of Easement, recorded on February 8,
1946 as Entry No. 1028090, in Book 457, at Page 221 to 222, books and records of the
Salt Lake County Recorder,
2.
On August 22,1952, the District transferred its easement to the United
States of America, Bureau of Reclamation ("USER") by Warranty Deed of Easement
recorded on September 11, 1962, in Book 953, at Pages 55 to 56, books and records of
the Salt Lake County Recorder.
3.
On October 2,2006, US BR transferred its interests in the easement back
to the District via Quit Claim Deed recorded on October 2,2006, as Entry No. 9862736,
in Book 9359, Pages 6770 to 6929, books and records of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
That transfer by USSR was pursuant to the terms of the Provo River Project Transfer
Act, 118 Stat. 2212, Pub. Law. 108-382, and the contract autliorized by the Prove River
Project Transfer Act, Contract No. 04-WC-40-8950.
DATED this J 0 day of June, 201L
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
OF SALT LAKE & SANDY

B

STATE OF UTAH

y
:
^
/Michael L. Wilson, General Manager
/

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the ^Y day of June, 2011, personally appeared before me Michael L,
Wilson, the General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy,
who duly acknowledged to me that he signed the foregoing Notice of Partial
Abandonment of Easement on behalf of the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake &
Sandy,, and that he signed the same for the purposes stated therein.

NOTARY
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CHAPTER 16

REGULATIONS FOR NON-DISTRICT USE OF
SALT LAKE AQUEDUCT AND
POINT OF THE MOUNTAIN AQUEDUCT
RIGHTS OF WAY
Last Updated: June 14,2010

PREFACE
This chapter of the P&P contains regulations governing the use of the Salt Lake
Aqueduct (SLA) and Point of the Mountain Aqueduct (POMA) rights of way,
construction, excavation, removal and/or placement of materials, or other earth work, on
SLA and POMA rights of way, and construction near enough to SLA and POMA rights of
way to potentially adversely impact those rights of wayt by persons or entities other than
the District
16-1

GENERAL BACKGROUND

(1)
SLA, The SLA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail
water service area, Sandy City's retail water service area, and other areas of Salt Lake
County and Utah County. The U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation
(Reclamation) designed and constructed the SLA under authority of the Reclamation Act
of 1902 and the Public Works Administration Appropriation Act of 1938. Since 1938,
the District has been responsible for the operation and maintenance of the SLA, has been
repaying to the United States all costs incurred in constructing the SLA, and has been
entitled to the use of the SLA. Pursuant to the Provo River Project Transfer Act,
Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the District, the Provo River
Water Users Association and the United States, title to the SLA was transferred to the
District on October 2, 2006,
(2)
POMA, POMA is a pipeline and associated facilities constructed by the
District to convey water to the District's member cities. The District owns POMA
facilities and is responsible for the operation and maintenance of all POMA facilities.
POMA is critical to the water supply of Salt Lake City's retail water service area, Sandy
City's retail water service area, and other areas of Salt Lake County and Utah County.
(3)
The intent of this Chapter is to provide guidelines and authorization to
staff for the licensing of uses of District corridors. Licenses should reasonably
accommodate other uses of District corridors so long as it is clear that such uses will not
materially interfere with the District's interests in the use, operation, maintenance, repair
and replacement of District facilities. Except as otherwise directed by the Board, fees for
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licenses should be reasonably calculated to generally recover direct and indirect District
costs associated with evaluating, approving, and administering such licenses. The
Engineering Committee or Board may authorize licenses in addition to those the staff is
authorized to issue by this chapter, or make exceptions to the regulations, where doing so
would serve the interests of the District and the public.
16-2

GENERAL INTENT OF REGULATIONS

(1)
District Assumption of Reclamation Agreements. Reclamation has
historically provided, by agreement, underlying fee owners, adjoining landowners, and
others, the right to use portions of the SLA right of way pursuant to 43 United States
Code, Section 387; 43 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 429, and Reclamation
Manual/Directives and Standards LND 08-01. As a condition of title transfer, the District
assumes all of the rights and responsibilities of Reclamation under validly existing
Reclamation agreements for use of the SLA right of way.
(2)
District's Proprietary and Regulatory Interests, Portions of the SLA and
POMA rights of way are held in fee, and portions are held under easement. Portions of
the POMA right of way are located under roads or city parks pursuant to license or
franchise agreements. The application of these regulations will necessarily vary
depending upon the nature of the ownership interest of the District. Regardless of the
nature of the District's ownership interest in the right of way, the District has regulatory
authority as a subdivision of the State of Utah to protect District facilities.
(3)
Pair Market Value of Use of District Fee Lands, The District is generally
obligated by state law to charge fair market value for use of fee lands. Eg, Salt Lake Co.
Comm'n v. Salt Lake Co. Attorney, 985 P.2d 899 (Utah 1999); Municipal Building
Authority of Iron Co. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 533
P.2d 118 (Utah 1975). The District's policy is that it will make reasonable efforts to
comply with this requirement, and also reasonably recover the estimated actual costs to
the District of processing and administering Encroachment Agreements, but will
otherwise attempt to minimize charges.
(4)
SLA Rights Reserved by the United States. Pursuant to the Provo River
Project Transfer Act, Pub.Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States, the United
States transferred the title of the SLA to the District and the United States reserved an
easement for the continued, lawful, non-motorized public access across the SLA to
adjacent public lands. The United States also reserved an easement for Central Utah
Project facilities within Utah County, All uses of the SLA right of way are subject to
these easements. The District's General Manager may deny a new or renewed
encroachment agreement if the District or other agency has any outstanding
encroachment issues with the applicant or related persons or entities.
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(5)
Security. The SLA and POMA are critical public infrastructure, and as
such the use of SLA and POMA rights of way will be subject to federal, state, local and
District statutes, regulations, rules, ordinances, policies and procedures designed to
protect public health, safety and welfare.
(6)
Non-motorized Public Trail Development. The District believes that
public, non-motorized recreational trail use of portions of the SLA and POMA rights of
way can be developed in a manner that does not adversely impact the security of the SLA
or POMA, and does not adversely impact the District's ability to use, operate, repair,
inspect, maintain or improve SLA or POMA facilities. The District may allow such
recreational trail development.
(7)
Non-licensed Encroachments. The District may periodically review its
rights of way to identify non-licensed encroachments. The District may take action to
remove such encroachments or bring encroachments in compliance with these
regulations, including payment of all required fees and charges as applicable.
16-3

DEFINITIONS

(1)
"Applicant" - A person or entity who applies for issuance of an
Encroachment Agreement by the District
(2)

"District" - The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake & Sandy.

(3)
"Encroachment Agreement" - The Agreement issued to a Grantee who
has successfully completed the application process.
(4)
"Grantee" - The person or entity applying for and receiving an
Encroachment Agreement from the District for use of SLA or POMA rights of way. Any
reference in these regulations to "Grantee" should also be interpreted as referring to
Grantee's contractors, subcontractors, employees, agents or representatives.
(5)

"Hazardous Materials" include:

(a)
Those substances included within the definitions of "hazardous
substances", "hazardous materials", "toxic substances", or "solid waste" pursuant to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 9601, et seq,, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 6901, et seq., the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. Section 1981, et seq., and the regulations
promulgated pursuant to such statutes.
(b)
Those substances listed in the United States Department of
Transportation Table (49 CFR 172.101 and amendments thereto) or by the United States
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Environmental Protection Agency as hazardous substances (40 CFR Part 302 and
amendments thereto).
(c)
Such other substances, materials and wastes which are or become
regulated or which are classified as hazardous or toxic under federal, state, or local laws,
statutes, ordinances or regulations. This does not include public sewers,
(6)
"POMA" or "Point of the Mountain Aqueduct" - A large transmission
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities. The
District owns, operates and maintains POMA.
(7)
"Reclamation" or "Bureau of Reclamation" - A bureau of the United
States Department of the Interior that designed and constructed the SLA and originally
held title to the SLA.
(8)
"SLA" or "Salt Lake Aqueduct" - The SLA is a large transmission
pipeline that provides municipal and industrial water to the District's member cities.
Title to the SLA was transferred to the District on October 2, 2006 pursuant to the Provo
River Project Transfer Act, Pub. Law. 108-382, and a title transfer agreement among the
District, the Provo River Water Users Association and the United States,

16-4 WRITTEN ENCROACHMENT AGREEMENT REQUIRED
(1)
Vehicle Access. Except where SLA or POMA is located under a validly
existing public road, street or highway, a valid Encroachment Agreement is required for
any vehicle access on or over the SLA or POMA. Weight restrictions for SLA and
POMA pipe must be strictly observed.
(2)
Excavation, Earthwork, Construction. Etc. Any excavation, removal of
material, placement of material or other earth work, or construction work on SLA or
POMA rights of way where the District holds fee title or easement requires a valid
Encroachment Agreement.
(3)
Improvements to Previously Approved Encroachments.
Any
improvement to a previously approved encroachment on District rights of way requires a
new Encroachment Agreement.
(4)
Form of Encroachment Agreement. Encroachment Agreements shall be
specifically tailored to reflect the proposed use by the Grantee and, therefore, may
contain terms, conditions and/or limitations that are not reflected in previous or sample
Encroachment Agreements. The District's General Manager is authorized to execute
Encroachment Agreements that are consistent with these regulations and applicable law
on behalf of the District. All activities conducted on SLA or POMA rights of way
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pursuant to an Encroachment Agreement shall be in strict conformity with these
regulations.
(5)
Encroachment Agreement Time Periods, The Encroachment Agreement
is valid for the time period specified in the Encroachment Agreement. The maximum
time period for an Encroachment Agreement is 25 years if the Encroachment Agreement
is issued to a public agency or utility. If the Encroachment Agreement is issued to a
private organization or home owner, the maximum time period is 15 years.
(6)
Encroachment Agreement Renewal. At the end of the effective time
period, the Grantee shall remove the encroaching facility or renew the Encroachment
Agreement. The Grantee shall pay all required fees and charges as applicable to renew
the Encroachment Agreement.
(7)
Grantees Responsible for Employees, Contractors. Grantees are strictly
liable for failure of their employees, agents, contractors or subcontractors to perform in
strict conformity with the Encroachment Agreement and these regulations.
(8)
Public Use of District Rights of Way. Use of District rights of way by the
public will not be permitted without a separate easement agreement requested by the
Grantee and granted by the District prior to issuance of the Encroachment Agreement.
16-5

APPLICATION PROCEDURES, FEES

The District's General Manager is authorized to develop application forms,
instructions, and procedures to guide the Grantee through the application process. The
District's Board of Trustees shall adopt a fee schedule for application fees, processing
fees, right of use fees, and any other fees consistent with these regulations. The Board
may delegate to the General Manager the ability to establish appropriate fees for use of
fee title lands. Fees for use of fee title lands may be waived in whole or in part by the
General Manager to the extent that the licensed use is determined to be beneficial to the
District (e.g., landscaping is developed and maintained by others).
16-6

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

(1)
Service Interruption. The SLA and POMA are pipelines that remain in
service year-round and are critical to the water supply of hundreds of thousands of
people. Service interruptions of either the SLA or POMA must be expressly
authorized by the District's General Manager, and are not permitted except in very
extraordinary circumstances. Unauthorized interruptions to pipeline service of the
SLA or POMA will not be tolerated and could result in the responstble'party paying any
and all incidental and consequential damages including, but not limited to:
(a)

Lost revenue from water sales;
16-5
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(b)

Engineering personnel time;

(c)

Operation and maintenance personnel time;

(d)
service capacity;

All costs required to return the affected pipeline back to its full

(e)
Any costs incurred by the District's member cities that are over
and above the normal costs associated with the affected pipeline;
(f)
interruption; and
(g)

The value of the water which could not be used due to the

Third party claims tied to lack of water.

Unauthorized interruptions of service will likely result in criminal and civil actions,
particularly if determined to be willful or negligent. The District will participate in,
and direct vigorous enforcement activities against any persons who cause, or who
are associated with causing, any unauthorized interruptions in service of the SLA or
POMA.
(2)
Contamination of Water Supply. Water conveyed by the SLA and POMA
is used in a municipal and industrial water supply. The Grantee shall not introduce
pollutants or place foreign materials of any kind in water conveyance facilities. In the
event of a hazardous material spill, or if there is any release of materials into the water
that may affect the operation of the SLA or POMA, the Grantee shall notify the District
immediately.
(3)

Prior Notice

(a)
Following the issuance of an Encroachment Agreement, the
Grantee shall invite the District to any Pre-Construction Meeting.
(b)
The Grantee shall contact the District either in writing or by phone
at least one week in advance of any planned test excavation or construction activities
within District rights of way.
(4)

Construction Activities

(a)
The Grantee shall designate a representative for field operations
who shall be the sole representative of the Grantee and the Grantee's contractors in
dealings with the District, and shall provide their name, address, and telephone number to
the District prior to commencement of construction.
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(b)
The Grantee shall limit its construction to the approved
encroaching facilities and construct the improvements strictly in accordance with the
approved plans or specifications.
(c)

The Grantee shall notify the District upon completion of

construction.
(d)
Within sixty (60) days after conclusion of construction operations,
all construction materials and related litter and debris, including vegetative cover
accumulated through land clearing, shall be disposed of in an appropriate manner.
(5)
Storage of Equipment or Materials. Equipment or materials shall not be
stored on access roads, or other access areas, unless specific written approval is given by
the District. Ail persons or entities using access roads shall coordinate with the District
to allow District personnel access to any access roads.
(6)

Hazardous Materials, Pesticides, Pollutants

(a)
Storage, handling, use, or transportation of hazardous materials is
strictly forbidden on or adjacent to any District right of way without the prior written
permission of the District All state, federal and local statutes, rules, regulations and
ordinances concerning the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides,
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances shall be strictly observed
(b)
Prior to the use of hazardous materials, insecticides, herbicides,
fungicides, rodenticides, and other similar substances on or adjacent to District rights of
way, the Grantee shall obtain, from the District, approval of a written plan for such use.
The plan shall state the type and quantity of material to be used, the pest to be controlled,
the method of application, and such other information as may be required. All use of
such substances on or near the District rights of way shall be in accordance with the
approved plan. If the use of a substance is prohibited by the Environmental Protection
Agency, it shall not be used. If use of a substance is limited by the Environmental
Protection Agency, it shall be used only in accordance with that limitation.
(7)

Vegetation. Restoration and Reseeding

(a)
Except as otherwise agreed by the District in writing, ground
surfaces within District rights of way must be restored to a condition equal to that which
existed before the encroachment work began, or as shown on the approved plans or
specifications.
(b)
The Grantee shall exercise care to preserve the natural landscape
and shall conduct its construction operation so as to prevent any unnecessary destruction,
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scarring, or defacing of the natural surroundings in the vicinity of the work. Except
where clearing is required for permanent works, ail trees, native shrubbery, and
vegetation shall be preserved and shall be protected from damage that may be caused by
the Grantee's construction operations and equipment unless otherwise directed by the
District. Movement of crews and equipment within the rights of way and over routes
provided for access to the work shall be performed in a manner to prevent damage to
roadways, grazing land, crops, or property.
(c)
Plans for restoration of District rights of way areas where soils and
surface materials are disturbed through actions incident to construction, operation, and
maintenance shall be approved by the District,
(d)
The Grantee shall be responsible for prevention and suppression of
all uncontrolled fires that are caused by the Grantee, its agents, or assigns. The Grantee
shall be responsible for restoration of damaged areas.
(8)
Damage to District Facilities. All damage to District facilities shall be
repaired by the Grantee to the satisfaction of the District. If emergency repair work is
necessary, or the Grantee fails to complete all work covered by the applicable agreement
with the District in a reasonable time as determined by the District, any remaining or
incomplete work will be performed by the District and the Grantee will be required to
reimburse the District for all expenses incurred by the District in completing the work.
(9)
Unanticipated Conditions.
If unanticipated field conditions are
encountered while a project is being undertaken, the District reserves the right to impose
additional or more stringent requirements than may be generally described in this
Chapter 16. The District may also issue a written amendment to the Encroachment
Agreement.
(10) Record Drawings. Within 30 days of completion of construction, the
Grantee shall provide to the District three (3) copies of record drawings. The record
drawings shall include, but not be limited to, X,Y,Z, GPS coordinates of District
facilities, utility crossings, manholes, drains, power poles, etc. A topographic survey
shall be completed to document any changes to grade. Electronic files of record
drawings shall be submitted to the District in a format acceptable to the District.
16 7

PROTECTION STANDARDS
(1)

Surface Structures

(a)
Surface structures are allowed within District rights of way so long
as construction and use of those surface structures do not alter or interfere with the use,
operation, maintenance, repair, replacement or improvement of any District facilities.
Approved surface structures include asphalt roadways (without utilities), parking lots,
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curbs, gutters, sidewalks, walkways , driveways and patios that are non-reinforced and not
connected to buildings. All surface structures are subject to approval by the District on
an individual basis.
(b)
Surface structures located over District pipelines shall be designed
to meet maximum allowable loading restrictions and minimum cover requirements as
determined by the District.
(c)
Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, if
the District determines that it is necessary to remove or damage surface structures for the
use, operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, or improvement of any District
facilities, repair or replacement of the removed or damaged surface structures will be the
responsibility of the Grantee and its successors.
(2)
Buildings, Other Structures. Buildings and other permanent structures are
not allowed to be constructed within or overhanging District rights of way. The
following types of structures are not allowed; buildings, footings, foundations, retaining
walls, block or concrete slab wails, decks, carports, trailers, light poles, flag poles,
trampolines, motor cross facilities, power poles, swimming pools, wading pools or ponds,
decorative pools or ponds, or similar water features. Other types of permanent structures
not listed will be evaluated by the District for approval
(3)

Vehicle Access Weight Restrictions

(a)
No vehicular traffic will be allowed over Type A SLA pipe unless
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District. No vehicular
traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over Type B, C, and D SLA pipe unless
adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the District.
(b)
No vehicular traffic exceeding HS-20 loading will be allowed over
the POMA unless adequate protection is provided and specifications approved by the
District.
(4)

Reasonable and Efficient District Access

(a)
The District shall have reasonable and efficient access to all
portions of District rights of way and facilities. No fences or similar barrier will be
allowed within District rights of way except as consistent with these regulations.
(h)
Except for District purposes, installation of new or replacement
fences is not allowed on District fee title property. Existing fences, previously authorized
by agreement prior to October 2, 2006, on or across District fee title property may, by
agreement, remain until District activities require removal, Other uses of District fee title
property will be allowed as set forth in other sections of this chapter of the P&P. Fences
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without footings or foundations may be allowed on property encumbered by District
easements on a case by case basis. Concrete walls and masonry block walls will not be
allowed. Grantee shall permit reasonable and efficient access to enclosed portions of
District rights of way.
(c)
Fences enclosing District structures or rights of way shall provide
gated openings large enough to permit reasonable and efficient access by District
maintenance vehicles without damaging the fence and improvements of the District rights
of way user. Grantee shall allow District to install District locks on access gates.
(d)
All fences within District rights of way are subject to removal by
District as required to maintain or replace pipe or structures. Except as otherwise
expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and replacement of fences shall be
the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors.
(5)

Trees and Vines

(a)
No new trees or vines will be allowed within District rights of way.
Existing trees and vines within 20 feet of centerline of District pipelines or on access
paths and roads used by District are not allowed Existing trees and vines outside 20 feet
of centerline of District pipelines or on access paths and roads used by District may
remain until removal is required for safe operation or replacement of the pipeline or
access paths and roads at the sole discretion of the District.
(b)
All vegetation within the District rights of way shall be maintained
by the property owner or Grantee, as the case may be. All vegetation within District
rights of way is subject to removal by District as required to maintain or replace pipe or
structures. Except as otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the District, removal and
replacement of vegetation shall be the responsibility of the Grantee and its successors,
(6)

Changes in Ground Surfaces, Lateral Support

(a)
All temporary or permanent changes in ground surfaces within
District rights of way are encroaching structures and require an encroachment agreement.
Grantee is required to comply with District requirements for minimum and maximum
depths of cover over the SLA and POMA.
(b)
Any fills and cuts on properties adjacent to District rights of way
shall not encroach onto District rights of way without specific written prior approval by
the District. Modifications of properties adjacent to District rights of way shall not
reduce lateral support for District rights of way without specific written prior approval by
the District.
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(7)
Drainage From or Onto District Rights of Way. Existing gravity drainage
over and from District rights of way must be maintained at all times. Any erosion from
construction, operation, maintenance or use activities must be controlled at all times. No
new concentration of surface or subsurface drainage may be directed onto or under the
District rights of way without a showing of adequate provisions for removal of drainage
water, and the specific prior written approval of the District.
(8)
Test Excavation. Prior to final design of any structure that encroaches
within District rights of way, an excavation must be made to determine the location of
existing District facilities. Any such excavation must be made only by, or in the presence
of, authorized District personnel.
(9)
Bedding for pipe or other District facilities. Compaction, Grantee is
required to comply with District requirement related to bedding of pipe and other District
facilities and compaction requirements.
(10) Metallic Strip. Any nonmetallic encroaching structure below ground level
shall be accompanied with an approved locator wire running through the entire length of
the District right of way.
(11)

Utility Crossings

(a)
Utility crossings of District rights of way will require an
encroachment agreement on an individual basis. Ail applicable state, city, and county
regulations shall be adhered to in the construction of utilities. Where utilities will be
constructed by or for a developer, but dedicated to a municipality or other local
governmental entity or regulated public utility, the District will require the Encroachment
Agreement to be signed by that municipality or other local governmental entity or
regulated public utility.
(b)
All utility crossings shall provide a minimum of eighteen (18)
inches of clearance between pipeline or conduit and the SLA or POMA. All sewer lines
shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each side of SLA or
POMA centerline, as directed by the District. All culinary pipeline crossings under the
SLA or POMA shall be installed in a carrier pipe extending a minimum of 25 feet each
side of SLA or POMA centerline, as directed by the District Carrier pipes shall consist
of either welded steel pipe or welded HDPE. Coating, lining and thickness of carrier
pipes shall be approved by the District.
(c)
Angles of crossing utilities shall be 90 degrees in relation to the
SLA or POMA whenever practicable, and not less than 60 degrees. Parallel utilities are
not allowed within District rights of way.
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(d)
Metal pipes which are in close proximity to and may affect District
pipelines shall implement corrosion protection measures that provide adequate protection
of the District's pipelines.
(e)
Boring of utility crossings may be required by the District.
Decisions will be made on an individual basis.
(f)
If material from the excavation is not suitable as backfill, it shall
be removed from the site by and at the expense of the Grantee,
(g)
Any buried utility shall be accompanied with warning tape. This
tape shall be located 12 inches above the structure and extend from right of way edge to
right of way edge.
16-8

APPEALS

Any decision of the General Manager regarding District rights of way may be
appealed to the Engineering Committee. All appeals shall be in writing explaining the
reasons for the appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the Engineering
Committee, the written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the
decision of the General Manager and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled
Engineering Committee meeting. Replies will be answered in writing. Any decision of
the Engineering Committee regarding District rights of way may be appealed to the
District's Board of Trustees. AH appeals shall be in writing explaining the reasons for the
appeal. In order for appeals to be considered by the District's Board of Trustees, the
written appeal must be received within 30 days following receipt of the decision of the
Engineering Committee and at least 10 business days prior to the next scheduled Board of
Trustees meeting. Replies will be answered in writing.
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